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INTRODUCTION
Substantial losses suffered by powerful financial institutions
in recent months due to derivative instruments1 have triggered
calls for increased regulation of financial derivatives markets.2
Because derivatives potentially can devastate institutions that im-
properly employ them, Japan, a country with little experience in
the derivatives markets,' seeks to insulate its financial markets
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See KENNETH R. KAPNER &JOHN F. MARSHALL, THE SWAPS HANDBOOK: SWAPS AND
RELATED RISK MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS 494 (1990). "Derivative instruments" are fi-
nancial instruments that derive their value from some other instrument or asset, such as
futures and options. Id. There are many types of derivatives. DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL
STREET WORDS 96 (1988). For example, an option is a type of derivative instrument that
secures value from the underlying security that may be purchased by exercising the
option. Id. The "underlying asset" is simply the asset that gives value to the derivative
security. Id. at 371-72. For instance, the underlying asset of a stock option is the stock
that may be purchased if the option is exercised. Id.
2. See Sara Webb et al., Britain's Barings PLC Bets on Derivatives-and the Cost is Dear,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at Al (discussing collapse of Barings PLC, two-century-old
British investment bank, from derivatives transactions executed by one of its traders in
Singapore); Steven Lipin & Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Settles Charges on Derivatives,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at Cl (chronicling losses suffered by Gibson Greetings Co.
from derivatives contracts suggested for investment by Bankers Trust, leading U.S. de-
rivatives dealer); G. Bruce Knecht, Derivatives Lead to Huge Loss in Public Fund, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A3 (explaining Orange County, California's losses of over US$1.5
billion from aggressive investing techniques of Robert Citron, county's treasurer, in
derivative instruments); Jack Reerink, Inside the MG Trading Debacle, FUTuRES, Apr. 1994,
at 58 (noting losses of oil trading firm MG Corp, U.S. subsidiary of German metals and
mining conglomerate, which amounted to US$1.3 billion from investments in deriva-
tives on New York Mercantile Exchange). "Derivatives are being singled out partly be-
cause they are misunderstood, or not understood at all-often being dismissed summa-
rily as so complex as to defy customary safeguards." The Beauty in the Beast, ECONOMIST,
May 14, 1994, at 21, 22. Derivatives, however, are simply another financial tool which
financiers and managers need to master. Id. at 24. Although the instruments are pow-
erful for the inexperienced, this doesn't necessarily suggest more regulations are
needed. Id. "[T]he same could be said of motor cars, and few people would advance
that as an argument for more traffic lights." Id.
3. Shuzo Aoki, Financial Futures Markets in Japan and Their Legal Framework, in CAP-
TAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN JAPAN 223, 223 (1992). The financial futures
market began in October 1985, with the introduction of the Japanese Government
Bond futures contract on the Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE"). Id. A futures contract,
or future, is a standardized contract executed by two parties that calls for deferred deliv-
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against this possibility by tightening regulations.4 While deriva-
tives have existed in the United States since 1974, 5 Japan's finan-
cial regulatory agency, the Ministry of Finance ("MOF"), seeks
guidance from U.S. financial markets in order to develop the
Japanese derivatives markets.6 Japan could decide to follow U.S.
proposals for regulation of the U.S. markets, which benefit from
more experience with derivatives than Japanese regulators, orJa-
pan could favor minimizing regulations of derivatives in order to
attract increased investment and to allow its derivatives markets
to grow.7 With heavy regulations already imposing burdensome
ery of commodities and financial instruments. KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at
500. Upon delivery of the commodity or instrument, the contract is settled with the
payment of cash. Id.
4. See Japan to Stiffen Derivatives Audits, Disclosure for Banks, Securities Firmns, Int'l. Bus.
& Fin. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 27, 1995). The Ministry of Finance ("MOF") has recently
increased audit staff and demanded tighter disclosure requirements from financial in-
stitutions trading in derivatives. Id. The MOF additionally seeks to impose new con-
trols on the futures industry by maintaining the power to ban speculative trading when-
ever MOF deems it necessary. Back to the Futures: Japanese Derivatives, ECONOMIST, Apr.
24, 1993, at 82.
5. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Act created the federal regulatory commission, the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), to supervise all futures activity. Id.;
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4a.
6. Hideaki Yamashita, Futures and Options on Security Derivatives, in CAPITAL MAR-
KETS ANu FrNANCIAL SERVICES INJAPAN 215, 222 (1992). As a slow-starter in the deriva-
tives markets, Japan "could learn from experiences of early-starters." Id.; see Japan a
Developing Country' in Derivatives: Think Tank, Japan Econ. Newswire, Oct. 26, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File (noting that although domestic volume has
tripled in past two years, Japan accounts for just one-tenth of world trading in financial
derivatives, such as bond and stock futures and options contracts).
7. See SARKisJ. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF THE WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS 54
(1990). Deregulation increases financial flexibility of investors, reduces transaction
costs, and attracts new capital to financial markets. Id. "The deregulation of financial
markets should be considered an investment in the financial well-being of a nation."
Id. For example, banking institutions that operate in a "deregulated environment" de-
cide "between safety and profitability." Id. The safety derives from larger capital
reserves and investments in "'safer' assets." Id. The banks seek profit through in-
creased investment opportunities, but at the expense of the banks' assuming undue
risk. Id. Competition for capital has reached a global scale in recent years. Richard C.
Breeden, Reconciling National and International Concerns in the Regulation of Global Capital
Markets, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE REGULATORY RE-
SPONSE 27 (John Fingleton ed., 1992). Evidence of the globalization of capital markets
abounds: A
- one out of every seven equity trades worldwide involves a foreign party on
one side or the other;
- between 1984 through 1990, Japanese investors increased their holdings of
[non-Japanese] securities by 30% per year, German investors increased
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costs in the Japanese derivatives markets and driving investment
capital to overseas markets,' Japan could reduce restrictions and
absorb the increased risk.9
This Note examines whether Japan should impose more re-
strictions on its derivatives markets. Part I discusses the develop-
mental history of Japan's financial markets and then examines
the current structure of Japan's capital markets and the regula-
tory bodies responsible for their supervision. Part I also in-
troduces the basic concepts of derivatives and the risks associ-
ated with using such instruments. Next, Part II compares the
regulatory structures of the derivatives markets in the United
States and Japan. Part II also explores the recent U.S. congres-
sional proposals for reform of U.S. derivatives markets, and dis-
cusses the effect of heavy regulation ofJapanese derivatives mar-
kets. Part III suggests thatJapan is prone to follow the proposed
U.S. solutions to the problem of derivatives-related losses,
thereby increasing regulation of the Japanese derivatives mar-
kets. Part III, however, cautions Japan against implementing
such strict regulation of derivatives markets because of the re-
sulting negative consequence of increased transaction costs, en-
couraging investors to shift capital to overseas markets and de-
creasing investment in Japan. This Note concludes, instead, that
by deregulation of the derivatives markets, Japan will be in a po-
sition to attract capital and, should the United States elect to
further regulate the derivatives market, benefit from the in-
creased investment opportunities exiting the U.S. market.
theirs by 18% per year, UK investors by over 17% per year, and U.S. investors
by 14% per year.
Id. at 27-28.
8. See Linda Sieg, Worries Remain of U.S. Derivatives Legislation, Reuters, Oct. 26,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUAPB File (explaining that participants in
Tokyo financial markets claim that "excessive formal and informal regulations are
dampening derivatives deals and forcing potentially lucrative business offshore"). De-
spite rapid changes in the financial markets since the 1970's, the MOF has refused to
remove all barriers in the markets. Thomas F. Cargill & Gregory F.W. Todd, Japan's
Financial System Reform Law: Progress Toward Financial Liberalization?, 19 BRooiL J. INT'L.
L. 47, 81 (1993).
9. See Breeden, supra note 7, at 29. Financial markets in different countries may
require alternative levels of regulations to balance domestic market needs for safe in-
vesting against "the realities of international competition." Id.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE FINANCIAL
MARKETS AD PRESENT STATUS OF JAPANESE
DERIVATIVES TRADING
Prior to World War II, capital markets' ° played a minor role
in Japan's financial activities." Following World War II, how-
ever, the Allied Occupation 2 ("Occupation") authorities im-
posed new requirements upon the Japanese financial system' 3
that sparked a period of economic transformation until the mid-
1970's.' 4 Afterjoining the leading industrial nations as a major
world economy during the 1970's, 15 Japan succumbed to com-
bined domestic and international forces by amending its finan-
cial regulatory structure.' 6 The abandonment of a fixed ex-
10. See ScoTr, supra note 1, at 48. The capital market is defined as "the market for
long-term funds where securities such as common stock, preferred stock, and bonds are
traded." Id. The term common stock is that "class of capital stock that has no prefer-
ence to dividends or any distribution of assets." Id. at 65. Common stockholders are
the owners of a corporation in that they have a claim over remaining assets after liqui-
dation. Id. Alternatively, most types of preferred stock show "ownership in a corpora-
tion and give[ ] the holder a claim prior to the claim of common stockholders" on the
corporation's earnings, in addition to the corporation's assets in the event of a liquida-
tion. Id. at 266.
11. ARON VINER, INSIDE JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 1 "(1988).
12. See JOHN OWEN HALiY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADox 105 (1991). The Allied Occupation ("Occupation") instituted reforms to de-
militarize and democratize Japan, including a new constitution. Id. General Douglas
MacArthur, the supreme commander for the Allied powers ("SCAP"), supervised the
Occupation's policies. T.F.M. ADAMS & IWAo HOSHn, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW
JAPAN 20 (1972). "The supreme commander Allied powers was an American and the
commander in chief of the armed forces Pacific, which constituted the bulk of the
occupation troops. Hence the administration of occupied Japan was largely based on
American policies." Id.
13. Makoto Yazawa, A Synopsis of Securities Regulation in Japan, in JAPANESE SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 23, 28 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983).
14. TAKEJI YAMASHrrA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS: A PRATIIONER's GUIDE 2
(1989). Transformation of the Japanese economy from its state after World War II into
its powerful role in the 1970's indicated a rapid and intense pursuit of Western econo-
mies. Id. Japan's resurrection of its financial markets was partly attributable to the
introduction of "Western technology" and "low-cost energy." Id. By 1973, Japan's de-
pendence on oil abruptly ended its high-growth era after Middle Eastern countries
raised oil prices. Id.; see INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 21
(1982) (explaining how Middle East disrupted oil markets in 1973, leading to world-
wide slowdown of economic activity and crises in oil-dependent economies).
15. VINER, supra note 11, at 3. After 1968, Japan's gross national product was sec-
ond to the United States. KAzuo TATEWAKI, BANKING AND FINANCE IN JAPAN 1 (1991).
Gross national product, or "GNP," is the output in dollar terms of finished goods and
services in the economy during one year. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 160. It is a standard
measure of the economic vitality of a country. Id.
16. VINER, supra note 11, at 3. The banking and securities industries, which re-
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change rate system 17 after 1973, and pressure by the United
States for reform during the 1980's,'8 triggered expansion of Ja-
pan's capital markets.19 Today, the MOF manages a tightly regu-
lated economy20 primarily by overseeing securities regulation 2'
mained compartmentalized throughout the post-World War II period, expanded and
merged their operations so as to accommodate foreign banks and securities companies
that were demanding equal access to sources of funds in Tokyo. Id.
17. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56-57. A foreign-exchange rate is "the number
of units of one currency that can be purchased for one unit of another currency."
KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 6. A fixed exchange rate entails active interven-
tion by the government to sustain the currency at a particular level. Id. In contrast, a
floating rate is subject to market forces of demand for the currency and existing supply.
Id. The Bretton Woods Agreement, Act of July 31, 1945, ch. 339, § 14, 59 Stat. 512
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bretton Woods
Agreement Act], served as the model for international exchange rate systems following
World War II. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286k (1988 & Supp. V.
1993) (indicating U.S. policy toward exchange rate transactions); KAPNER & MARSHALL,
supra note 1, at 6. The Bretton Woods Agreement was negotiated among 47 Western
nations at the end of World War II in the town of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.
KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 6. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act authorized
the United States to join the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286
(1988 & Supp. V. 1993). The Bretton Woods system established a fixed exchange rate
system based on the dollar and gold. KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 6. Although
the agreement imposed monetary discipline on each participant, it broke down in the
early 1970's. Id. It disassembled as a result of "excessive monetary expansion on the
part of the United States." Id. Most exchange rates involving the dollar have been
allowed to float ever since. Id. Thereafter, exchange rates became extremely volatile
without the standard of the dollar, in turn creating an "ideal environment" for coun-
tries to participate in foreign exchange speculation. Id.
18. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56-57. The trade deficit with Japan forced the
United States to seek to "internationalize" the yen, to encourage Japan to allow non-
Japanese access to financial markets, and to increase generally the pace of Japanese
domestic liberalizations. Id. at 56 n.31. A "trade deficit" exists where there is an "excess
of goods and services that a country buys from abroad over goods and services sold to
other countries." ScoTT, supra note 1, at 363.
19. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56-57. Expansion of the Japanese financial
markets was illustrated by deregulation of loan rates; increased reliance by corporations
on capital markets; interest rates becoming market-determined in money and capital
markets; valuation of the yen based on market forces; and the increasing use of the yen
as a desirable reserve by foreign banks. Id. at 57.
20. See VINER, supra note 11, at viii ("Japan is, and will continue to be for quite
some time, the most tightly regulated and compartmentalized economy in the free
world."). The MOF has sought to control the process of liberalization in the financial
markets. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 81. "Japanese regulators.., become anxious
at the thought of unleashing the resources of the private sector in an unfettered free
market." Id.
21. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market. The Ministry of Finance and Securities
Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 444 (1994). The author describes three
elements of securities regulation in Japan that contrast with the U.S. model on which it
was based: "the institutional structure and jurisdiction of [MOF], the ministry's licens-
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and supervising the banking and insurance industries.2 Despite
this era of rapid expansion, however, the introduction of trading
in complex derivative arrangements in 1985 did not result in a
formally regulated structure until 1988, 23and remains in its de-
veloping stage. 4
A. Japan's Financial Markets: Historical Perspective and Present
Structure of the Financial Market System
The present structure of Japan's financial system represents
three decades of rapid expansion from the years immediately
following the end of World War II in 1945.25 Today, the MOF
acts as the primary regulatory authority over the Japanese econ-
ing authority over securities companies, and the lack of private monitoring of the secur-
ities markets." Id.
22. Id. at 446.
23. See Financial Futures and Exchange Law, Law No. 77 of 1988, art. 1 (Japan)
(revised in 1992) (SurveyJapan trans., 1992) [hereinafter FELl. The Japanese govern-
ment created the Financial Futures Exchange with the enactment of the FEL in 1988.
Id. Thereafter, only members of the Financial Futures Exchange could execute transac-
tions in financial futures. Id. art. 35. The FEL defines "financial futures transactions"
as "dealings made at the financial futures market pursuant to the standard and means
prescribed by the Financial Futures Exchange," and lists the types of transactions as
(1) Dealing agreed to by the parties concerned for the purpose of giving and
receiving currency money, etc., as well as their epuivalent [sic] at a certain
time in the future, which can be settled by giving and taking the differences in
prices in the case of currency money, etc., as an object [until] the relevant
transaction[s] are resold or repurchased.
(2) Dealing agreed to by the parties concerned with the purpose of giving
and receiving money the value of which is based upon the differences between
the numerical value agreed to in advance by the parties as the financial indica-
tor (hereinafter called "agreed numberical value") and the actual numerical
value of the relevant financial indicator for a certain period in the future.
(3) Dealing agreed by one of the parties concerned to grant the other party
a right which enables the party to settle the following dealings between the
parties by a declaration of the intention of one of them (hereinafter called
"financial option") and to pay the other party the value equivalent to this ....
Id. art. 2.4. Article 2 of the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 permits parties to
enter derivatives transactions based on securities. See Securities and Exchange Law,
Law No. 25 of 1948, art 2.14 (Japan) (as amended to 1992) (Capital Markets Research
Inst. ed. & Toru Mori trans., 1993) [hereinafter SEL] (permitting parties to enter trans-
action based on value of securities index).
24. See Japan a Developing Country' in Derivatives: Think Tank, supra note 6 (noting
that although domestic volume has tripled in past two years, Japan accounts for just
one-tenth of world trading in financial derivatives).
25. See ADAMS & HosHn, supra note 12, at 21 (describing Occupation's reforms as
affecting every phase of life in Japan for period of several years). Immediately following
World War II, Japan restructured its economy based on guidance from the Occupation
au'thorities. Id. By the 1970's, Japan had become the second most powerful financial
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omy.2 6 Japan's present financial system resembles the structure
of other industrialized nations.2 7 Generally, such a structure
contains a commercial banking system,'2  government-owned fi-
nancial institutions, 9 securities companies,30 capital markets,"1
and money markets. 2
1. Evolutionary Period of the Japanese Financial Markets From
the Pre-World War II Period Until Today
The zaibatsu holding companies33 were integral to Japan's
early economic and financial development.T 4 The post-World
War II period marked a turning point for the Japanese financial
markets, mainly resulting from the influence of the Occupa-
tion.3 5 After a period of rapid economic expansion from 1955 to
1961,36 Japan joined the global marketplace as a major econ-
omy.3
7
country in the world. See TATEWAKi, supra note 15, at 19-20 (explainingJapan's second-
rated status in gross national product).
26. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing MOF as supervisor of
Japanese economy, including securities, banking, and insurance industries).
27. VINER, supra note 11, at 3.
28. Id. The commercial banking system accepts deposits from individuals and in-
stitutions, lends funds to businesses, and executes foreign exchange transactions. Id.
29. Id. at 4. The government owns specialized financial institutions that help fund
specific sectors of the economy, such as the Export-Import Bank of Japan, the Small
Business Finance Corporation and the Housing Loan Corporation. Id. at 4-5.
30. Id. at 4. The securities companies provide brokerage services, underwriting
syndicates for corporations, and deal in the securities markets. Id.
31. Id. The capital markets offer a means for public and private sector financing.
Id.
32. Id. The money markets provide banks with borrowed funds and enable the
central bank to implement monetary policy. Id.
33. Id. at 1. The zaibatsu consisted of "family-owned bank-centered holding com-
panies," and symbolized the "world's first multinational conglomerates." Id.
34. See id. ("[T]he financial market history of prewar modern Japan... is largely
the story of the flow of funds and goods among Japanese government institutions on
the one hand and zaibatsu controlled entities on the other.").
35. See TATEWAXI, supra note 15, at 9-10 (discussing major reforms of Occupation,
including closing all wartime financial institutions and revision of securities regulation
with SEL of 1948).
36. JAPAN SECURMES RESEARCH INsTITUTE, SECUFRTIES MARKET INJAPAN 1992, at 16-
17 (1992). The stock market experienced two booms that resulted in rapid increases in
stock prices. Id. at 16. The stock price average of the TSE quadrupled from its 1955
average of 374 points to its 1961 average of 1549 points. Id. at 17.
37. See supra note 25 (discussing Japan's ascendancy to world's second largest
economy, behind United States, by 1970's).
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a. Pre-World War II Period
During the pre-World War II period of dominance by the
zaibatsu,38 securities regulation centered around spot39 and arbi-
trage transactions.40 The Stock Transaction Ordinance of 187441
signified the earliest attempt to legislate stock trading on an ex-
change.42 Because there was no stock exchange,43 however, this
ordinance was later replaced by the Stock Exchange Ordinance
of 187844 to govern early speculation in grain transactions.45 Re-
form of securities regulation took precedence during the ensu-
ing period, culminating in the Exchange Law of 1893 ("1893
Law") .46 The 1893 Law, which would remain in force through
World War II, was applied to both securities47 and commodi-
ties48 exchanges.49 The 1893 Law authorized organization of the
38. See supra note 33 (defining zaibatsu). These conglomerates possessed vast eco-
nomic power, and exerted extensive control over the national economy. Milhaupt,
supra note 21, at 434.
39. See ScoTr, supra note 1, at 332 (defining "spot commodity" as one available for
immediate delivery). A spot transaction, unlike a time transaction, involves immediate
delivery of the particular object of the contract (either a commodity or financial instru-
ment). Id.
40. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 26. "Arbitrage" is defined as the "simultaneous
purchase and sale of substantially identical assets in order to profit from a price differ-
ence between the two assets." ScoT, supra note 1, at 15. According to a theory known
as the Law of One Price, two assets with identical attributes should sell for the same
price, as should one asset trading in two different markets. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPI-
TAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE OIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 171 (1992). If the prices
of identical assets should differ, one can make a profit by selling the asset that is over-
priced and buying it back where it is underpriced. Id. The arbitrager, who specializes
in detecting such misallocations in the markets, locks in a small profit, "otherwise
known as a free lunch." Id.
41. Kabushiki Torihiki Jorei [Stock Transaction Ordinance] of 1874 (Japan).
42. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 26.
43. See id. at 106. The regulations in 1874 were designed to facilitate growth of
private corporations. Id. The regulations "proved unsuitable for the traditional arbi-
trage transactions," and combined with the low volume of securities trading, "no one
volunteered to establish a stock exchange." Id.
44. Kabushiki Torihikisho Jorei [Stock Exchange Ordinance], Great Council of
State Proclamation No. 8 of 1878 (Japan).
45. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 26-27.
46. Torihikisho Ho [Exchange Law], Law No. 5 of 1893 (Japan).
47. See Sco-rt, supra note 1, at 316. A "security" is an instrument that defines cer-
tain rights and obligations, such as ownership in a corporation (stock) or creditor rela-
tionship to a particular firm or government entity (bond). Id.
48. See id. at 64. A commodity is a "generic, largely unprocessed, good that can be
processed and resold." Id. In the United States, grains, metals, and minerals are exam-
ples of commodities that are traded, generally in very large amounts, in the financial
markets. Id.
1978 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURIVAL [Vol. 18:1970
exchanges as either stock corporations5° or membership organi-
zations.51 The commodities exchanges became the latter,
whereas nearly every stock exchange was organized as a corpora-
tion.5" The 1893 Law also recognized time transactions, or fu-
tures trading,5 3 in addition to spot transactions,54 which added a
strong speculative flavor to the early trading.55
b. Post-World War II Period
The Occupation dissolved the existing organization of the
Japan Securities Exchange 56  ("Exchange"), and initially sus-
pended all trading on the Exchange on August 9, 1945.5 1 Un-
able to obtain the Occupation's authorization to reopen, the Ex-
change dissolved in 1947.58 Thereafter, the Occupation insti-
tuted three changes to the structure and operation of Japan's
49. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 27.
50. Id. at 27. A stock corporation, or "stock company," is a "company owned by
stockholders, with the ownership evidenced by transferable certificates." ScoTr, supra
note 1, at 337.
51. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 27. A membership organization is a firm that gains
all rights and privileges associated with membership on the exchange. JOHN DoWNEs &
JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 251 (1985).
A "member firm" may vote on exchange policy, and is also committed to such obliga-
tions as settling disputes with customers through exchange arbitration procedures. Id.
52. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 27. "Stocks of the stock exchanges themselves were
listed and traded on the particular exchanges." Id.
53. See supra note 3 (defining futures contract).
54. See supra note 39 (defining spot transaction).
55. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 27.
56. See SECURITIES MARKET INJAPAN, supra note 36, at 14-15. After the outbreak of
World War II, the Japanese government tightened its control over the stock markets.
Id. at 14. The Japanese financial policy abandoned its free market qualities in defer-
ence to the more important goal of allocating funds for the war effort. Id. The securi-
ties market suffered because the existing 11 stock exchanges were reorganized into "a
single quasi-public corporation," which became the Japan Securities Exchange. Id. at
15.
57. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 28. Securities companies responded to the suspen-
sion of trading on the exchanges by executing trades at their own offices as well as on
unofficial markets. SECURITIES MARKET IN JAPAN, supra note 36, at 15. In order to reo-
pen the securities markets, the Japanese had to meet requirements established by the
Occupation authorities. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 28.
58. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 28. The Occupation created the Securities Coordina-
tion Liquidation Commission ("Securities Commission") in June 1947 to dispose of sev-
eral existing securities. SECURITES MARKET INJAPAN, supra note 36, at 15. By the time
the Securities Commission was dissolved inJuly 1951, it had sold over 233 million shares
of stock valued at over US$39 million, according to the prevailing exchange rate be-
tween yen and dollars. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 434.
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financial markets. 9
First, the Occupation changed the structure of Japanese fi-
nance by dissolving the zaibatsu holding companies.6' The Oc-
cupation sought to democratize Japan6 1 and to make the indus-
trial sector more competitive.6" During the Securities Democra-
tization Movement,6" power shifted from the previously powerful
zaibatsu to individual investors.64
Second, during this period both city banks and some re-
gional banks assumed leadership roles.65 The pre-World War II
zaibatsu formed into new groupings of keiretsu.66 These new
companies utilized a strategy called "interlocked cross-share-
holding "61 as a means to control a group of companies within
59. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 53-55.
60. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (defining zaibatsu and noting that
these companies were integral part ofJapan's early financial development). The Secur-
ities Commission reorganized 83 zaibatsu holding companies, containing 4500 subsidi-
aries, into less powerful financial companies. VINER, supra note 11, at 2.
61. See Ams & HosHH, supra note 12, at 23-27. The Occupation accomplished its
goal to democratize Japan by dissolving the zaibatsu and by instituting agricultural and
labor reform. Id. at 23. Dissolution of the zaibatsu resulted in an increase in the
number of individual shareholders participating in stock ownership. Id. at 26. Simi-
larly, agricultural and labor reform raised the income level of individual farmers and
laborers, completing the most important aspects for economic democratization. Id. at
26-27.
62. See id. at 23. The Occupation demanded that the Japanese government pres-
ent a plan to strengthen the industrial sector. Id. Accordingly, SCAP demanded an
overhaul of industrial and commercial combinations, a program to discourage the fos-
tering of private monopolies, and a plan to increase "equal opportunity to firms and
individuals to compete in industry and commerce on a democratic basis." Id.
63. SEcuarMEs MARKET IN JAPAN, supra note 36, at 15; see supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text (explaining Occupation's efforts to democratize Japan by dissolving
zaibatsu and strengthening industrial sector).
64. SECURIriEs MARKET IN JAPAN, supra note 36, at 15.
65. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 54. Business enterprises demanded credit for
financing and growth, which only the banks could supply. TATEwAKI, supra note 15, at
10. Except for the Bank of Japan, Japan's financial institutions are categorized as pri-
vate, Japanese financial institutions, government financial institutions, and non-Japa-
nese financial institutions. Id. at 99. The private depository institutions include the city
banks and the regional banks. Id.
66. VINER, supra note 11, at 2. Keiretsu is a general term used to describe clusters of
affiliated corporations. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 435 n.50. The term keiretsu "derived
from the word kei, meaning 'faction or group' and retsu, meaning 'arranged in order.'"
VINER, supra note 11, at 11. Because the structure of each affiliate differs, they are
sometimes grouped separately among "horizontal" and "vertical" keirets Milhaupt,
supra note 21, at 435 n.50.
67. See VINER, supra note 11, at 2. In this type of structure, each company pos-
sessed limited stakes in other keiretsu members, usually amounting to one to three per-
cent of equity. Id. Thus, a majority of a corporation's shares was held by a concentra-
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the collective organization.68
Third, the Occupation altered the regulatory structure,
marking a new era within the financial markets.69 The Securities
and Exchange Law ("SEL") of 1947,70 despite its overhaul by the
Occupation in 1948,71 established an independent Japanese Se-
curities and Exchange Commission7' ("JSEC") to oversee the se-
curities markets. 73  The government, however, abolished the
JSEC in August 1952.74 The MOF assumed primary regulatory
authority overJapan's financial markets, followed by the Bank of
Japan75 and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.76
tion of other companies within the membership. Id.; see, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 21,
at 435-40 (discussing emergence of cross-shareholding in three major stages, beginning
with reacquiring of shares by large corporate groups from those securities distributed to
individuals during securities democratization movement in 1950's and ending with fi-
nancing of equity capital by banks in 1980's). "Equity" refers to both common and
preferred stock. Scoi-r, supra note 1, at 118. "For example, an investor may prefer
investing in equities as opposed to bonds." Id.
68. VINER, supra note 11, at 2.
69. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 53. To provide a legal framework to accom-
pany the democratization movement, SCAP directed the Securities Division of the MOF
in preparing the new Securities and Exchange Law of 1947. ADAMs & HOSHn, supra
note 12, at 51; Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 22 of 1947 (Japan). Because
SCAP engineered the draft of the new law, the law represented powerful U.S. influence.
Id.
70. Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 22 of 1947 (Japan). The first version of
the Securities and Exchange Law, enacted in 1947, dissolved the Japan Securities Ex-
change and redirected supervisory power over securities regulation from the MOF to an
independent agency, the Japanese Securities and Exchange Commission ("JSEC").
Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 430-31. SCAP did not approve of the 1947 statute, however,
and, as a condition for reopening the exchanges, the statute was rewritten to fashion a
system more closely resembling the U.S. regulatory regime. Id.
71. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948 (Japan). Under SCAP's direction, the revised SEL of
1948 paralleled the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. V
1993) [hereinafter Securities Act], and the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. Milhaupt, supra
note 21, at 431.
72. See JoNATHAN IsAAcS & TAKASM Ejnu, JAPANESE SECURrrIES MARKET 2 (1990).
The Japanese Securities and Exchange Commission ("JSEC") was established as an in-
dependent administrative body, and was modelled on the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id.
73. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 433.
74. Id. During the latter half of 1951, as the Occupation was ending, a Japanese
governmental panel recommended abolishing the JSEC because it was perceived to be
ineffective. Id. The MOF opposed the JSEC's creation because the new agency as-
sumed securities-related powers previously retained by the MOF. Id. at 432. TheJSEC
was abolished in 1952 when the MOF assumed daily administrative responsibilities over
the securities industry. IsAACs & EJinu, supra note 72, at 2.
75. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 53. The Bank ofJapan directs monetary policy
1995] DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL MARKETS 1981
In exercising control over the Japanese securities markets,
the Occupation authorities conditioned the reopening of the
stock markets" upon three principles.78 First, every transaction
executed on a securities exchange"9 had to be recorded in
chronological order.8 ° Second, all member firms of the ex-
changes had to trade listed securities81 solely on a securities ex-
change.82 Third, the Occupation banned futures trading. 83 In
order to satisfy the Occupation's requirements for reopening
the securities markets, the SEL, amended by the Japanese gov-
ernment in 1948,84 superseded the Exchange Law of 1893.85
The SEL of 1948 represented a modified version of the U.S. Se-
and maintains orderly credit conditions in the financial system by defending the yen,
the Japanese currency. VINER, supra note 11, at 326.
76. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 53. The Securities Division of MOF's Finance
Bureau, which today is called the Securities Bureau of the MOF, was given the sole
responsibility of administrative oversight of the securities markets. Milhaupt, supra note
21, at 433. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications administers the vast Postal
Savings System, in which fixed savings are deposited. TATEWAiu, supra note 15, at 142.
77. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining suspension of trading by
Occupation).
78. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 29.
79. Id. "Securities exchange" is a facility where organized trading of securities
takes place. Sco-rr, supra note 1, at 315.
80. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 29.
81. Id. A "listed security" is any security traded on an established securities ex-
change. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 201. These are generally more liquid than securities
that do not trade on an exchange. Id. The term "liquid" refers to "an asset that may be
bought or sold in a short period of time with relatively small price changes engendered
by the transaction." Id. at 199. By contrast, an "illiquid" asset is one that is "difficult to
buy or sell in a short period of time without its price being affected." Id. at 169. A U.S.
Treasury bill is an example of a liquid asset. Id. at 199. A large block of stock or a small
amount of an infrequently traded stock might be illiquid. Id. at 169.
82. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 29.
83. Id.; SECURIInEs MARKET IN JAPAN, supra note 36, at 16; supra note 3 (defining
futures). Because the Occupation abolished futures trading, the practice of time trans-
actions abruptly ended in favor of spot transactions. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 29-30.
84. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948 (Japan); see supra note 71 (discussing amendment of
SEL to closely parallel U.S. securities laws).
85. Torihikisho Ho [Exchange Law], Law No. 5 of 1893 (Japan); Yazawa, supra
note 13, at 28. The Occupation was satisfied only initially with a portion of the new
Securities and Exchange Law, which established the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Id. at 29. Certain things were acceptable to the Occupation, such as the licensing
system for stock exchanges and the application of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as an advisory body for implementing and enforcing the law. Id. "This
prompted the Occupation authorities to urge the Japanese Government to amend the
law in order to incorporate the basic features of the U.S. laws." Id.
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curities Act of 193386 ("Securities Act") and the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") .17 The SEL of 1948 be-
came central to Japan's system of statutory regulation.88 The
SEL of 1948 altered the oversight of securities regulation, includ-
ing a new system of securities registration, 9 improved the licens-
ing system for companies engaged in securities business,90 and
segregated securities business from banking business.91
c. Post-Occupation Era Until the Present
During the post-Occupation era of 1952 to 1960, Japanese
financial institutions increasingly participated in developing the
Japanese economy.92 The Long-Term Credit Bank Law of
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra note 71 (noting
similarity of SEL to U.S. Securities Act of 1933).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra note 71 (explaining
similarity of SEL to U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Yazawa, supra note 13, at 24.
"With the exception of the Philippines and Pakistan, Japan may be the only country to
have adopted almost in their entirety the securities regulation statutes of the United
States." Id. (footnote omitted). Generally, Japanese securities regulation derives its au-
thority from the SEL of 1948, Law No. 25 of 1948 (Japan), the Securities Investment
Trust Law, Law No. 198 of 1951 (Japan), translated inJAPAN SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, JAPANESE SECURmES LAws 101 (1982), and the Law on Foreign Securities Firms,
Law No. 5 of 1971 (Japan) (as amended to 1981), translated in JAPAN SECURITEs RE-
SEARCH INsTrrUTE, JAPANESE SECURITIs LAws 155 (1982). Yazawa, supra note 13, at 23-
24. The laws are administered by the Bureau of Securities in the Ministry of Finance,
the Japanese counterpart of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in the
United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (establishing SEC as commission to oversee U.S.
securities laws).
88. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 24.
89. See id. art. 4 (mandating all securities sold through public offering must first be
registered with MOF, except where aggregate amount of selling price is below specified
level).
90. See id. art. 28 (providing that every company wishing to engage in securities
business must first be licensed by MOF).
91. Id. art. 65. The SEL forbids banks from engaging in the securities business
except where certain conditions are met, such as trading related to government securi-
ties. Id. art. 65.2(2) (a). The changes in the Japanese system of securities regulation,
embodied in the SEL of 1948, included the segregation of securities business from
banking business based on the model of the U.S. Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Stea-
gall Act). Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 48 Stat. 162, 184-85,
188-89 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Yazawa, supra note 13,
at 29.
92. VINER, supra note 11, at 2. Financial institutions were oriented exclusively to-
ward domestic recovery, and "[flavored industries [like power and chemical compa-
nies] were nurtured and protected." Id. at 3. In addition, Japanese international fi-
nance languished in its formative stage, consisting mainly of foreign exchange dealings
conducted by the Bank of Tokyo on behalf of the government "and those corporations
involved in the exportation of manufactured products." Id. Japan's currency, the yen,
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1952,11 authorizing the credit banks to provide long-term capital
to corporations, granted banks a central role in the Japanese
economy.94 Aided by government encouragement, interest rate
controls, and a variety of legal limitations on the development of
bond markets,95 bank finance became more important than se-
curities-based finance.96 The Japanese economy entered a pe-
riod of rapid expansion from 1955 to 1961, and the bond market
resumed trading on the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges in April
1956.97
The oil crisis of 1973-1974,98 combined with the vast in-
crease in government debt financing that followed,99 caused an
was not used as a reserve currency by the world's major central banks: 97% of imports
and 60% of exports were denominated in non-Japanese currencies. Id. "Japan under
reconstruction was a provincial nation." Id.
93. Long-Term Credit Bank Law, Law No. 187 of 1952 (Japan), translated in 6 Law
Bull. Series (EHS), BD 1 (1985).
94. See id. art. 6, at BD 2-4 (authorizing long-term banks to make loans, to accept
deposits, to perform exchange transactions, and to buy and sell securities for limited
purposes); VIt.,R, supra note 11, at 2.
95. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 440. The dependence on bank finance was accom-
panied by lagging activity within the capital markets. Id. at 440 n.79. The "bond mar-
ket" is the place where commercial banks and bond houses trade bonds. CHARLES J.
WoELF L, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING & FINANCE 145 (1994). A bond market comprises
mostly institutional investors in state and local government issues. Id. A "bond" is an
interest-bearing certificate of debt constituting an obligation, by a business corporation
or a government, to pay "a principal amount on a stated future date and a series of
interest payments ... until the stated future date." Id. at 141.
96. See Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 440. Japanese investors and economic partici-
pants gained financing from the banks rather than the capital markets. Id. The excep-
tion was for underwriting business, which banks had dominated before the war.
TATEWAm, supra note 15, at 10. After the revision of the SEL in 1948, banks were pro-
hibited from underwriting securities other than public bonds, and securities firms took
on an increasing role in the markets. Id.; see supra note 71 and accompanying text
(discussing revision of SEL in 1948).
97. SEcuRITrrIs MARKET IN JAPAN, supra note 36, at 16-17; see supra note 36 (describ-
ing expansion of Japanese economy in terms of quadrupling of TSE price index be-
tween 1955 and 1961).
98. See WoRn ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 12, at 21. In 1973, events in the Mid-
de East disrupted market forces for oil prices. Id. Oil prices sharply escalated, and
imposed financial hardship on most industrialized countries. Id. Countries dependent
upon the Middle East for oil had to decrease their purchases of oil, which slowed inter-
national economic activity and depressed real income. Id. As a result, the shortage of
oil caused an economic crisis in oil-dependent economies. Id.
99. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 55-56. The shortage of oil caused deficits to
double in the central government and overall public sectors, which the MOF was un-
able to fund. Id. Thus, the MOF relied even more heavily on banks to fund the
purchasing of government debt. Id. at 56. Debt, or "liability," is an obligation to pay to
another party some amount in money, goods, or services. ScoT'r, supra note 1, at 196.
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initial downward shift in Japan's financial development. 100 Sub-
sequently, Japanese banks began to demand liberalization of the
financial system in return for their efforts to bail out the govern-
ment's debt.10' The securities markets sought liberalization be-
cause of the increasing internationalization of Japanese fi-
nance, 10 2 which offered the securities markets new opportunities
to expand their role in the financial system.103 The corporate
sector, which experienced a slower rate of investment, became
less dependent on the banking system for financing of its opera-
tions.104 Corporations increased their liquidity and viewed liber-
alization of the financial system as an opportunity to increase
profits and to diversify into financial asset management.10 5 The
A "deficit" is "[a] negative retained earnings balance," wherein accumulated losses ex-
ceed revenue generated to cover those losses. Id. at 92.
100. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 55-56. The MOF lacked capital with which to
fund the government and public sector deficits, which resulted in fewer funds available
for economic growth. Id.
101. See id. at 55-56. Thus, the Japanese banks supported the government by issu-
ing bonds to the public, which it would guarantee in the event of default. Id. A "bond"
is a written obligation by one party who becomes responsible for the actions of another.
ScoTr, supra note 1, at 33. The term "default" denotes an inability of a borrower to pay
interest or principal on a debt when payment is due. Id. The "principal" is simply the
face amount of a bond, to which the lender is guaranteed in full upon maturity. Id. at
271. The "maturity" date is when "the issuer must retire the bond by paying face value
of the bond to its owners." Id. at 214.
102. TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 19-21. Japan's status as second in the world in
GNP after 1968 caused it to account for a major share of the world's foreign trade and
financial transactions. Id. at 19-20. Thus, ifJapan had not lowered the barriers tojapa-
nese markets, development of international transactions would have suffered during
the 1970's. Id. at 20. There followed a substantial increase in foreign lending and the
number of non-Japanese banks that entered Japan. Id.
103. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56.
104. Id. The share of financing of corporate businesses declined from 53% in
total funding during the period 1970-1974 to 34% in 1980-1984. TATEWAi, supra note
15, at 21. In turn, bank lending declined from 60% in 1970-1974 to 45% in 1980-1984.
Id. Corporations relied to a smaller extent upon the banks because manufacturing
firms no longer felt banks would retaliate by destroying credit relationships. Id. Before
the oil crisis in 1973-1974, the corporate sector invested in plants and equipment, caus-
ing the largest deficit of funds. Id. at 24. After the crisis, investment demand for plants
and equipment fell, which reduced deficits of the corporate sector. Id. By 1978, the
corporate sector's deficit "was almost nil." Id.
105. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56; see TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 24-27
(discussing surplus of cash in corporate sector since early 1970's and investment in
plants, equipment, and financial instruments to boost profits). "Financial assets" are
financial instruments that possess the benefit of a future claim to cash. WOELFEL, supra
note 95, at 444. The issuer of the financial asset promises to make future cash payments
to the investor, who holds the instrument representing the intangible asset. Id. "Asset
management" refers to the planning procedure of a financial institution that accounts
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household sector °6 sought higher rates of return on their invest-
ments after experiencing a period of higher real income
growth."' Two catalysts, abandonment of a fixed exchange rate
system after 1973,108 and pressure by the United States for re-
form in the early 1980's,1°9 resulted in the expansion of Japan's
capital markets." 0
Division of the Japanese banking and securities sectors by
the SEL changed during the 1980's."' Article 65 of the SEL 112
excluded banks from engaging in securities operations, includ-
ing dealing,113 underwriting," 4 and brokerage of securities." 5
for the institution's assets, including financial assets. Id. at 51. "Its intent is to quantify
and control risk." Id.
106. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56. The household sector is part of the pri-
vate, non-financial sector. TATEWAK, supra note 15, at 19. In comparison, the personal
sector includes households and non-corporate businesses. Id.
107. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56. Raises in wages occurred at rates exceed-
ing 10% between the 1950's and 1970's, which spurred demand for higher yielding
assets. TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 19. Until 1975, accumulation of financial assets by
the private, non-financial sector rose at a rate exceeding the growth rate of nominal
GNP. Id. The term "nominal return" signifies any rate of return without adjustment
for inflation. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 234. In contrast, "real income" is defined as in-
come adjusted for inflation, or changes in the prices of goods and services. Id. at 286.
"Real income measures purchasing power in the current year after an adjustment for
changes in prices since a selected base year. If money income increases more than
consumer prices, real income increases." Id.
108. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56-57; see supra note 17 (explaining Bretton
Woods exchange rate system, its dissolution in 1973, and its replacement with floating
exchange rate system).
109. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56-57; see supra notes 16, 18 and accompany-
ing text, (explaining U.S. encouragement to internationalize Japanese currency and to
allow greater access of non-Japanese banks to Japanese financial markets).
110. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 56-57; see supra note 19 (noting deregulation
of loan rates, corporations' increased dependence on capital markets, relaxation of
control over interest rates, and greater acceptance of yen currency in non-Japanese
markets as indicators of expanding financial market).
111. Yamashita, supra note 14, at 260; see supra note 91 (explaining influence of
U.S. Glass-Steagall Act on Japan's decision to separate banking and securities indus-
tries).
112. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 65 (Japan),
113. See ScoiTr, supra note 1,.at 87. A "dealer" is "[a]n individual or a firm that
buys assets for and sells assets from its own portfolio as opposed to bringing buyers and
sellers together." Id.
114. See SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2.6 (Japan). An underwriter acquires all or
part of the securities from an issuer for the purpose of selling the amount to the public.
Id. The SEL additionally includes within the definition of underwriter individuals who
contract with an issuer to obtain a remainder of the issue when no one else wishes to
acquire it. Id. The term underwriter also embraces individuals who "participate[ ] di-
rectly or indirectly in the issuance or the sale of the security by public offering." Id. An
"issuer" signifies "any person who issues or proposes to issue any security." Id. art. 2.5.
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In addition, the combination of Article 43 of the SEL1 16 and Arti-
cle 10 of the Banking Law,117 along with Article 65 of the SEL,118
created the division between securities and banking similar to
that created by the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act.119 Originally, Article
65 was intended to preventJapanese banks from dominating the
financial system and to encourage the development of the secur-
115. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 65 (Japan). Article 65 defines securities busi-
ness in reference to Article 2. See id. art. 2.8 (listing actions, such as trading in securities
futures on security indexes, and options on securities, which constitute securities busi-
ness excluded to banks). The statute exempts banks from this provision where "securi-
ties index futures trading, securities options trading or foreign market's securities fu-
tures trading" is undertaken pursuant to a customer order or for investment purposes.
Id. art. 65. The statute defines "trading in futures of securities index, etc." as
a transaction under which a party thereto promises the other party to pay an
amount of money computed on the basis of the difference between the nu-
merical value agreed to in advance between the parties as an index of the
securities concerned... or the numerical value agreed to as the price of secur-
ities ... which shall prevail on a certain future date.
Id. art. 2.14 (Japan). All futures trading in securities or securities indexes are restricted
to those designated as such instruments by the MOF, or the securities exchange that
controls the particular security index. Id. The term "securities options trading" is de-
fined as
a transaction under which a party thereto ... grants the other party the right
to effect any of the transactions below specified between the parties thereto
... and under which the other party agrees to pay a price for such transaction.
(1) Buying and selling of securities, or
(2) .trading in futures of securities index, etc ....
Id. art. 2.15.
116. Id. art. 43. Article 43 restricts securities firms from engaging in business not
defined as securities business under the statute. Id.; see supra note 115 (discussing Arti-
cle 2 definition of "securities business"). As an exception, the MOF may specifically
designate that a security company's business is "not inconsistent with the public interest
or the protection of investors." Id. art. 43.
117. Banking Law, Law No. 59 of 1981 (Japan), translated in 6 Law Bull. Series
(EHS), BA1, 5-6 (1987). This section restricts banks from engaging in any businesses
other than banking and businesses auxiliary to banking. See id. art. 10.2, at BA 5 (listing
services that banks may perform); see also Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 57-58 (noting
same).
118. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 65 (Japan).
119. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and collectively referred to as Glass-Steagall
Act). Japanese banks may hold equity of other companies, but such holdings by banks
can not exceed five percent of the equity of another company. See Law Relating to
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of
1947 art. 11, (Japan) translated in 2 Law Bull. Series (EHS), KAI, KA16 (1992) (forbid-
ding any company engaged in financial business from owning stock of another com-
pany in excess of five percent, or 10% if it is insurance company); YAMASHrrA, supra
note 14, at 260 (noting same); see also VINER, supra note 11, at 27-28 (noting how Article
65 of SEL of 1948 mirrored Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in United States).
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ities markets.1 20 Following the slowdown of economic growth in
Japan during the 1970's and the early 1980's,121 the Japanese
government revised both the Banking Law and SEL to clarify the
permitted activities of both industries. 122 The separation of op-
erations of banks and securities firms became less apparent due
to the actions of Japanese institutions in foreign countries and
the activities of non-Japanese institutions in Japan.12 3
120. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 59. The purposes for Article 65 derived from
the Occupation's mandates:
Whatever the original policy purposes, however, they were purposes of the
Occupation, not the Japanese legislature, and in this sense Ai'ticle 65 fulfills
no domestic policy purpose at all. By its endurance ... Article 65 has become
an accepted feature of the Japanese financial system, and... it has come to
serve a quite different policy purpose than that originally intended.
Id. Article 65 was intended to dilute the financial power held by the banks. VINER,
supra note 11, at 28. Today, many securities firms have relationships with banks. Id.
Nomura, established in 1925, was spun off from the bond department of Daiwa Bank
(then named Osaka Nomura Bank); Yamaichi Securities Co., established in 1896, has a
loose relationship with Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan; Daiwa Securities Co.,
traced to Fujimoto Bill Broker (established 1902), confers with Sumitomo Bank; and
Nikko Securities Co. works with Mitsubishi Bank. Id. The protective territories of Arti-
cle 65 facilitated such complementary relationships. Id. "Had this proviso not existed,
there can be little doubt that the powerful city banks, with their extensive networks of
branches... and corporate relationships, would long ago have absorbed or destroyed
the majority of securities firms." Id.
121. TATEwAm, supra note 15, at 16-17. The "Nixon oil shock" in 1971, a break-
down of the fixed exchange rate system, and the oil crisis of 1973 triggered major
changes in the Japanese economic structure. Id. at 16. The Nixon shock signified the
impact made on the world economy by President Nixon's statement on August 15,
1971. Id. at 1 n.*. Nixon announced policy changes in the conversion of dollars to
gold and a proposal for restructuring countries' exchange rates. Id. The Japanese
economy could no longer support rapid economic growth, and new regulations were
adopted to reflect this shift toward slower growth. Id. at 16-17.
122. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 41-42. The amendments of the Banking Law were
the first substantial revisions since 1927. Id. Along with the partial revision to the SEL,
banks were allowed to engage in securities activities related to government and other
public bonds. See Banking Law, Law No. 59 of 1981 (Japan), arts. 10.2(2), 10.2(4),
translated in 6 Law Bull. Series (EHS), BA1, BA5 (allowing banks to buy and sell speci-
fied securities); see also supra note 91 (noting provision in SEL permitting banks to deal
in government-related securities).
123. YAMASHrrA, supra note 14, at 260. Yamashita notes that U.S. banks have en-
gaged in many activities in Japan, and Japanese subsidiaries of city banks have under-
taken many activities in the international markets. Id. at 260-61. The Japanese finan-
cial system no longer distinguishes between banking and brokerage activities to the
extent imposed by Article 65. JoNATHAN ISAACS, JAPANESE EQuinEs MARKErs 3 (1990).
At present, Article 65 would appear to exist in name alone...." Id. A "subsidiary" is a
"company controlled or owned by another company." ScoTr, supra note 1, at 342. The
integration of banks and securities operations in Japan mirrored the same develop-
ments in the United States. VINER, supra note 11, at 28-29. "As U.S. banks began to
provide products and services previously the exclusive domain of brokers and as U.S.
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In the late 1980's, the MOF directed two of its advisory
councils12 4 to examine potential structural reforms of the Japa-
nese financial system, including Article 65. 12 The councils advo-
cated changes that were adopted in the Financial Systems Re-
form Law of 1992 ("FSRL"). 26 The FSRL permitted banks and
securities firms to own majority-owned subsidiaries in other
fields.127 The FSRL also empowered the banks to deal in securi-
ties, even without establishing a securities subsidiary. 128 The
MOF, required to approve separately the "security" status of new
products,' 9 permitted banks to continue to deal in products not
brokers began to provide cash management services bearing a remarkable resemblance
to savings accounts, the 'Chinese wall' separating banking and broking activities prom-
ised slow dissolution. Japan followed suit." Id. at 29; see Steven Lipin & Timothy L.
O'Brien, Repeal of Glass-Steagall May Hit Wall Street With Takeover Wave, WALL ST. J., Mar.
27, 1995, at C1 (discussing reform of Glass-Steagall Act as offered by Rep. James Leach,
Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, and the White House, and predicting consolidations of banks
and securities companies should Glass-Steagall Act be repealed); Banking Act of 1933,
Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. and collectively referred to as Glass-Steagall Act).
124. See Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 68. The Financial System Research Coun-
cil and the Securities and Exchange Council represented interests of the banking and
securities industries. Id. at 68 n.74. Advisory councils are ad hoc committees attached
to the Japanese ministries. Id. at 68 n.73. Their purpose is "to investigate, to debate
and to advise the ministry on whatever issues may be referred to it." Id. The councils
usually represent a cross-section of interests that could be affected by the measures to
be considered. Id.
125. Id. at 68.
126. Law Concerning the Realignment of Relevant Laws for the Reform of the
Financial System and the Securities TradingSystem, Law No. 87 of 1992 (Japan), trans-
lated in, The Amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law to Insure the Fairness of Securities
Trading (Part I), CAMR1 REv., Apr. 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Financial Systems Reform
Law]; Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 71-72.
127. Financial Systems Reform Law, arts. 43-2, 65-3; see Cargill & Todd, supra note
8, at 71 n.93 (noting that banks owning less than majority of shares of subsidiary save
expenses by establishing securities subsidiaries in conjunction with other shareholders).
128. Financial Systems Reform Law, art. 65, (2), items (2)-(4). Commercial paper
and certain loan trusts are no longer subject to prohibitions of Article 65. Cargill &
Todd, supra note 8, at 71-72. Furthermore, the law authorizes banks to deal with private
placements in other securities. Id. at 72. Private placements are sales of securities to
purchasers who are "qualified institutional investors." Id. at 72 n.97. A transaction
qualifies as a private placement if there is little risk that securities will be transferred to
the public by a public offering or to investors other than qualified institutional inves-
tors. Id. Commercial paper represents short-term promissory notes with different ma-
turities, ranging from one month to six months. TATEWAKA, supra note 15, at 71. Banks
and securities firms act as brokers in the commercial paper market. Id.
129. See SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2.1(9) (Japan) (defining securities as those
that may be "prescribed by a Cabinet order"). The term "securities" is narrowly defined
in the SEL, which provides a specific list of bonds, stock shares, and various trust certifi-
cates. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2 (Japan). One author notes that Article 2.1(9) of
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specifically enumerated as securities.130
2. Regulatory Bodies and the Structure of the
Japanese Capital Markets
The MOF, modeled after the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission131 ("SEC") in the United States, exercises control over
the Japanese economy.13 2 In 1992, the Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission13 3 ("SESC") was established to aid the
MOF in supervising securities and financial futures transactions
by securities firms."M Together, the agencies supervise the se-
curities firms,' 3 5 which execute most of the securities business in
Japan, 136 the capital market,3 7 and the financial futures mar-
the SEL would leave open room for an expansive definition of "securities," but no new
securities have been identified by the MOF under this provision. Hideki Kanda, Politics,
Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured Investment
Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 569, 573 (1992).
130. Cargill & Todd, supra note 8, at 72. Since "securities" are narrowly defined,
Article 65 is implicated when new securities products are introduced, requiring exami-
nation by the the Securities and Banking Bureaus of the MOF. Cargill & Todd, supra
note 8, at 67. In 1990, securities firms could offer a variety of new foreign exchange-
related products previously reserved to banks and securities products that combined
commodity and currency futures with real estate, stocks, and bonds. Kyle Pendragon,
Japanese Banks Flouish Under Article 65 Rules, FurruRES, Aug. 1990, at 53.
131. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 444. The U.S. SEC was created under the Ex-
change Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The SEC is the federal agency
that administers the securities laws in the United States. Scoi-r, supra note 1, at 315.
132. See Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 460-61. The MOF supervises the activities of
all financial institutions in the private and public sectors, sets monetary policy, or-
ganizes the government budget, and leads international negotiations in defining the
Japanese financial markets. TATEwAKI, supra note 15, at 175. The MOF's power is so
comprehensive that "[nlothing may happen without approval, either implicit or ex-
plicit, from the MOF." Id.
133. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 56 (Japan) (delegating authority to Securities
and Exchange Surveillance Commission ("SESC") to order securities firms to report all
of their transactions and business operations, as provided for in Article 55). The
agency was established on July 20, 1992, and aids the MOF in enforcement of antifraud
rules and oversight of securities firms. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 470. "The 1991
amendment primarily addressed the problem of compensation arrangement for
losses.... While under the previous system, only the guaranteeing of compensation was
against the law, the amendment made compensation per se illegal." Hiroshi Oda, Latest
Developments of the Securities and Exchange Law, inJAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF
INTERNATIONAUZATION 125, 138 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).
134. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 55 (Japan); Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 470; see
supra note 3 (defining financial instruments called futures).
135. See VINER, supra note 11, at 15-19. The Big Four securities firms represent the
major firms in Japan, followed by the second and third tiers of smaller securities firms.
Id. at 15.
136. See TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 133. Other private financial institutions in
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a. Financial Institutions and the Regulatory Framework
Although Japan possesses a tightly-regulated economy,1 3 9
the MOF's enforcement strategy relies foremost on informal co-
operation, rather than on formal enforcement through litiga-
tion.14 ° Initially predicated on the role of the SEC in the United
States, 141 the MOF has diverged from SEC precedence.1 42 The
MOF's informal stance contrasts with the SEC's formal enforce-
ment objectives, 43 and the MOF undertakes greater responsibil-
ity than the SEC."4
Japan include insurance companies, securities investment trust management compa-
nies, and brokers in money markets and foreign exchanges. See id. at 128-40 (discuss-
ing private financial institutions in Japan).
137. Id. TheJapanese capital market comprises the securities markets, which con-
sist of the bond market and the stock market. Id.
138. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting beginning of futures trading
in Japan in 1985).
139. See supra notes 8, 20 (explaining howJapan has refused to remove barriers in
markets, despite rapid change since 1970's, for fear of unleashing resources in unregu-
lated environment such as private sector).
140. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 444. Japanese securities regulation is de-empha-
sized by regulators within the MOF because of the societal propensity toward coopera-
tion in all aspects of the economy. See FRANK K UPHAM, Law AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
PosrwARJAPAN 198 (1987). In 1981 an agency sponsored a study in which each major
central government agency and many local governments were asked to "report on their
use of informal administrative guidance." Id. The consensus by those polled indicated
that "informality is preferred by every level of government and in all areas of govern-
ment-citizen contact." Id. Despite this informality, the public defers to the MOF's
power without compromise: "[The MOF] is perceived, both by itself and by the public,
as the nation's most elite civil service, as guardian of the nation's economic health...
in short, as the pinnacle of the Japanese state.. .. " Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 444.
Makoto Yazawa, once Professor of Law at the University of Tokyo, regarded the
lack of enforcement authority as integrally connected to the traditional way of life in
Japan. Yazawa, supra note 13, at 26. He advocated that power be concentrated in an
independent agency similar to the U.S. SEC so as to effect better control over the rap-
idly changing financial markets. Id.
141. See supra note 87 (explaining MOF's original similarity to SEC in United
States).
142. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 445.
143. See id. at 445. The MOF relies on "administrative guidance," or informal en-
forcement to achieve regulatory objectives. Id. By contrast, the SEC's enforcement
strategy emphasizes administration of financial institutions' disclosure practices and en-
forcement of antifraud provisions in the U.S. securities laws. Walter Werner, The SEC as
a Market Regu/ator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755, 782-83 (1984).
144. Id. at 446. The MOF has jurisdiction over the raising and expenditure of
public funds as well as the banking, securities and insurance industries. Id.; see supra
note 132 (explaining MOF's supervision of financial institutions, monetary policy,
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Using Article 8 of the National Government Organization
Law,145 the Japanese government created the SESC 4 in order to
reduce the enormous responsibilities undertaken by the MOF. 147
The SESC conducts investigations into violations of antifraud
rules and inspects securities companies, securities exchanges,
and the Japan Securities Dealers Association."4 The SESC
evolved out of the government's recognition of the need for re-
form in the Japanese capital markets. 149  The SESC remains
hampered, however, by weak enforcement capability and a tradi-
tional view of securities regulation based on informal coopera-
tion. 150
The MOF and SESC jointly regulate the securities firms,
budget, and international financial negotiations); Milhaupt supra note 21, at 446 (ex-
plaining "sweeping range of MOF's jurisdiction," and comparing MOF's "conflicting
roles as overseer of the national budget and regulator of the entire financial industry"
to smaller responsibilities of SEC and other regulatory agencies in United States).
145. Kokka Gyosei Soshiki Ho [National Government Organization Law], Law No.
120 of 1948. "Article 8 bodies-such as the SESC-generaly lack substantial formal
powers and remain under the ultimate control of the ministry with which they are affili-
ated." Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 469 n.216.
146. See supra note 133 (maintaining that SESC aids MOF in supervising securities
transactions).
147. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 490. The securities scandals in Japan, in 1991,
revealed the ineffectiveness of the MOF as the primary regulator of securities transac-
tions. See id. at 466-67 (explaining that scandals triggered "intensive public scrutiny" of
Japanese securities regulation). The SESC was established in recognition of the enor-
mous responsibilities assumed by the MOF, and in an effort to improve monitoring of
such transactions. Id. at 467. The securities scandals involved illegal-payments by secur-
ities firms to institutional investors who lost money in the markets during 1990. Id. at
460-61. The incidents led to MOF-sponsored sanctions, lawsuits by small investors, and
renewed scrutiny of the securities industry. See generally id. at 459-67 (discussing back-
ground and effects of securities scandals).
148. Id. at 470. The Japan Securities Dealers Association is an organization of se-
curities companies, created to impose a self-regulatory mechanism in the Japanese mar-
kets. VINrR, supra note 11, at 333. This resembles the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") in the United States, which was established in 1939 to regulate the
markets not associated with any of the stock exchanges. Sco-r, supra note 1, at 225.
The NASD is comprised of brokers and dealers responsible for regulating themselves.
Id.
149. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 472; see supra notes 133, 145-47 and accompany-
ing text (explaining origin of SESC after securities scandals in 1991 in Japan).
150. Milhaupt, supra note 21, at 480. The existing realities of administrative pow-
ers within Japan limit the enforcement capability of the SESC. Id. The history of secur-
ities regulation in Japan, coupled with the circumstances under which the SESC was
established, give rise to three questions: "Does... [it] have sufficient powers to accom-
plish its substantial tasks? Will the placement of the SESC within MOF undermine its
role as market monitor? And... does its establishment represent a shift in regulatory
stance away from informal, promotional policies toward formal market regulation
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which execute most of the securities business in Japan.151 Secur-
ities firms play the central role in Japanese securities markets, 152
engaging in dealing, 53 brokerage activities, 154 underwriting, 5
and selling of stocks and all types of bonds. 56 The Big Four
grounded in the SEL?" Id. at 472; see id. at 466-80 (analyzing SESC's role as new admin-
istrative arm of MOF).
151. TATEWAm, supra note 15, at 133.
152. Id.; see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (explaining that Big Four
securities firms and second- and third-tier firms comprise financial institutions dealing
in most securities business in Japan).
In addition to securities firms, securities finance companies, peculiar to Japan, pro-
vide equity and bond financing through the major stock exchanges. VINER, supra note
11, at 38. They extend loans to companies listed on the stock exchanges as well as to
securities companies and the securities companies' clients. Id. Although they provide a
necessary link between the securities and the money markets, they may gradually disap-
pear as the financial markets are liberalized. Id. at 39. If the provisions of Article 65,
SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 65 (Japan), continue to be relaxed in favor of more
integration between banks and securities companies, financing will be facilitated,
thereby obviating the need for the finance companies. Id. At present, there are three
major companies, the Japan Securities Finance Company, the Osaka Securities Finance
Company, and the Chubu Securities Finance Company. Id. at 38. "Money market" is
defined as the market for trading short-term, low-risk securities, and is usually com-
prised of dealers linked by electronic communications rather than by the exchanges.
Sco-r, supra note 1, at 217.
153. See supra note 113 (defining dealer).
154. See id. at 38. A "broker" is "[a]n individual or a firm that brings together
buyers and sellers but does not take a position in the asset to be exchanged." Id. Many
firms operate as broker-dealers, performing both services depending upon different
variables, such as market conditions and the size, type, or security involved. Id. at 87. A
broker, rather than a dealer, is more likely to form an unbiased opinion on a security
because there is no economic interest involved in executing a transaction for an inves-
tor. Id. at 38.
155. See supra note 114 (defining underwriter).
156. TAEwAm, supra note 15, at 133. Each securities firm must obtain a license to
practice in each type of business from the MOF. Id. Prior to World War II, securities
firms were small, mainly because zaibatsu conglomerates executed most of the stock
trading as they held most of the equity. VINER, supra note 11, at 14; see supra notes 33-
34, 38 and accompanying text (discussing domination of zaibatsu during pre-World War
II period). After World War II, securities companies acted as brokers in the stock and
bond markets, areas from which the banking industry was absolutely excluded. VNER,
supra note 11, at 7; see supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (explaining separation
of securities operations from banking operations in Japan by virtue of Articles 65 and 43
of SEL and Article 10 of Banking Law). During the post-World War II period, the
Japanese stock market emerged as a favored place in which individuals chose to invest
their money. VINER, supra note 11, at 14. In 1949, individuals held a majority of shares
of corporations, totalling approximately 69.1%. Id. Thereafter, the MOF encouraged
mergers of securities firms in order to prevent bankruptcies of existing small firms. Id.
The MOF reduced the number of registered securities firms from 1152 in 1949 to 244
at the end of March 1986. Id. As a result, the MOF reorganized the securities firms
into three tiers within Japan. Id. at 15.
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securities firms" 7 control a majority of the market for underwrit-
ing, followed by two tiers of smaller companies. 158 The second
tier, comprised of ten significantly smaller companies," relies
heavily on brokerage commissions from securities trading, as
does the third tier of registered securities firms.'60 In addition,
many of the second- and third-tier firms are affiliates or satellites
of the Big Four firms. 6' Lastly, the three-tier structure of secur-
ities firms in Japan is compromised by a growing category of
non-Japanese securities firms.' 62
b. Structure and Laws of the Capital Markets
After 1975, the Japanese securities markets expanded, as a
result of the large-scale flotation of government bonds, 61 the in-
ternationalization of finance, 164 and the innovation 165 that ac-
157. VINER, supra note 11, at 15. The Big Four, Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and
Yamaichi, rank among the six biggest securities firms in the world. Id. Part of the Big
Four's success derives from their marketing techniques, which they learned from U.S.
investment firms in the 1960's. See id. at 18-19 (noting that salaried salesmen specifi-
cally target wealthy taxpayers by frequently consulting references published by Tax Bu-
reau, and that each firm maintains over 100 domestic sales offices with thousands of
sales personnel).
158. Id. at 15.
159. See STEPHEN BRONTE, JAPANESE FINANCE: MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 79-80
(1982). The largest of the smaller second-tier companies is NewJapan Securities. Id. at
79. The second-tier companies depend on stock brokerage and dealing, rather than
underwriting, for the major portion of their income. Id. at 80.
160. VINER, supra note 11, at 15. Unlike the second-tier firms, the third-tier com-
panies are too small to qualify for underwriting licenses. BRONTE, supra note 159, at 80.
The third-tier companies possess individual clients and lack comprehensive research
facilities. Id.
161. VINER, supra note 11, at 15. There are 93 total securities firms in Japan: six
are non-Japanese; four are the Big Four; 10 are second-tier firms; 73 are third-tier firms.
Id. Thirty of the smaller firms are affiliated with Nomura, 19 are affiliated with
Yamaichi, and a portion of the remainder are affiliated with banks. Id.
162. Id. at 16. For example, Salomon Brothers, a U.S. securities firm, was the 11th
largest security firm in Japan in 1986 in terms of operating profits, and was the third
largest trader in the bond futures market. Id. Merrill Lynch, another U.S. securities
firm, became the first non-Japanese firm to list its shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
in November 1986. Id.
163. See TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 17. Government bonds were sold to enable
the government to raise money and finance the large public sector deficit. Id.; see supra
notes 95-100 and accompanying text (explaining increase in government and public
sector deficits during 1970's resulting from oil crisis, and subsequent aid of banks in
bailing out government's debt). The increase in government bonds added volume to
the trading markets for bonds, which resulted in the development of direct finance
through the securities market. TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 17.
164. See supra notes 25, 102 and accompanying text (explaining Japan's achieve-
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companied deregulation in the markets.'66 The period follow-
ing 1975 marked the diversification of financial assets along with
an increase in investors from banks to institutional investors, 167
individuals, and non-Japanese persons. 16 In order to handle the
changes in the capital markets, a committee appointed by the
MOF sought to revise the definition of "securities" in 1988.169
Although no changes occurred, the committee recognized that
securities companies were forbidden from conducting a business
other than securities business.170
Most securities transactions between parties other than the
issuer take place on the Japanese stock market, which includes
ment of rank of second in world in GNP, which caused Japan to lower barriers tojapa-
nese markets in order to aid development of international transactions).
165. See TATEWAIU, supra note 15, at 46. Development of new financial products
increased as life insurance companies, securities firms, and other financial institutions
participated in the growing capital markets. Id.
166. Id. at 17-20. During the pre-World War II period, banks possessed the domi-
nant role in providing funds because of the rapid industrialization and the shortage of
investment funds. SECURITIES MARKET INJAPAN, supra note 36, at 14. After World War
I, the development of heavy industries resulted in the extensive expansion of the stock
and bond markets. Id.
167. Se WOELFEL, supra note 95, at 596-97. An "institutional investor" signifies an
entity that trades in securities in such large quantities that it gains preferential treat-
ment and obtains lower commission rates. Id. at 596. Regulations usually do not apply
to these entities because they are presumed to be more knowledgeable and able to
protect themselves against fraud. Id. at 596-97. Examples of institutional investors in
most financial systems include pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, un-
ions, and other organizations that trade securities in bulk quantities. Id. at 597.
168. TATEWAKI, supra note 15, at 82.
169. Shigeki Morinobu, Review of Securities Regulation in Japan, in Capital Markets
and Financial Services inJapan 8, 12 (1992). Shigeki Morinobu, the Director for Inter-
national Affairs of the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, stated: "Abundant
Japanese capital, which is supported by high savings ratio, is needed everywhere in the
world. For our capital market to meet these demands and supply the funds smoothly,
the review of the basic system is necessary." Id. at 11. The Securities and Exchange
Council, an advisory body to the MOF, created the Fundamental Research Committee
in September 1988 to study the Japanese capital market. Id. They deliberated over
changes in the structure of the capital market "based upon the standards of efficiency,
internationality, soundness and stability." Id. at 11-12.
170. Id. at 13. Specifically, the committee proposed to widen the role of institu-
tions other than securities firms by allowing them to partake in transactions involving
securitized products that are not explicitly defined in the SEL. Id. "Therefore it is
proposed that those who engage in a business other than securities business should be
allowed to engage themselves in certain securitized products by introdu[cing] a limited
license system." Id. This proposal recognized the innovation that had created new
products that, although resembling securities, did not fall within the definition of secur-
ities under the SEL. Id.
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trading in the secondary market.' 71 The secondary market is di-
vided between those transactions that occur at the stock ex-
change and those that take place over the counter ("OTC").172
171. TATEWAKi, supra note 15, at 82; see ScoTr, supra note 1, at 312. The "secon-
dary market" comprises trading of existing securities among investors, usually through
an intermediary, such as a broker. Id. The primary market, in contrast, comprises issu-
ers, subscribers (those who reserve the right to purchase securities from the issuers),
and intermediaries who act as the brokers between issuers and subscribers. TATEWAK,
supra note 15, at 81. The intermediaries include underwriters and trustees. Id. The
trustees are of two types: for subscription and for collateral. Id. at 82. The former are
entrusted by the issuer to deal with necessary clerical work concerning the subscription
of an issue of corporate bonds. Id. The latter administer collateral that is attached to a
collateralized bond on behalf of the bondholder. Id. "Collateral" is any asset pledged
as security for a loan, entitling the lender to sell such collateral in the event of default
by the borrower. Sco-r, supra note 1, at 62-63. Article 65 of the SEL prohibits under-
writing business to financial institutions other than securities firms except the markets
for government bonds, municipal bonds, and government-guaranteed bonds. SEL, Law
No. 25 of 1948, art. 65.2(2)(a) (Japan); see supra note 91 (identifying and explaining
same provision in SEL); TATEW An, supra note 15, at 81-82. In general, corporate securi-
ties are underwritten only by securities firms. Id.
172. Id. at 82. The over-the-counter ("OTC") market is a large aggregation of
dealers who make markets in securities. Scorr, supra note 1, at 252. In contrast to an
exchange that is a physical location where trading occurs, OTC trading is effected
through telephone or computer. Id. Without formal regulations of an exchange, OTC
markets tend to be more speculative because of the lack of a standard price. Id. An
individual or dealer "makes a market" by quoting prices at which securities may be
bought or sold. Id. at 207.
The Securities Research Institute noted the chief characteristics of the exchange
market:
(1) Prices are consecutively determined every day when the sessions are
held.
(2) There exists a fixed market where the parties to the transactions can
gather.
(3) Trading is limited to members, who are required to possess certain quali-
fications.
(4) Trading is limited to listed stocks that have met certain basic standards.
(5) In connection with the trading of the listed stocks, the system of a cen-
tralized market is adopted so that buy and sell orders may converge on the
market, and the trading contracts are concluded based upon the principles of
competitive bidding.
(6) In order to simplify the settling of accounts, a system of clearing ac-
counts has been adopted.
(7) To assure fairness in trading, the exchange reserves the right to supervise
the trading by enacting appropriate regulations.
SECURrrIES MARKET IN JAPAN, supra note 36, at 41-42. The Institute also characterized
the OTC market:
(1) Transactions are executed over the counter of securities firms;
(2) it has no fixed marketplace; it exists only in the abstract;
(3) trading is conducted through negotiations between a buyer and a seller;
(4) because prices are determined through isolated negotiations, they could
vary from one firm to another; and
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Because OTC transactions in stocks promote unstable prices,
stocks listed on an exchange may not be traded OTC.171 Over
the counter trading in bonds, which is permitted, is more preva-
lent 174 than trading in stocks, which is concentrated at the stock
exchanges. 175 The stock exchanges are corporations that are or-
ganized in order to comply with the SEL, with membership lim-
ited to securities firms. 176 Currently, there are eight exchanges,
with the Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE") conducting nearly
eighty percent of total trading volume of all exchanges, and the
Osaka Exchange ("OSE") carrying fifteen percent of the vol-
ume. 177 In October 1985, the bond futures market was added to
the TSE.178
The Financial Futures and Exchange Law 79 ("FEL"), to-
gether with the revision of the SEL in 1988,180 subjected Japan's
(5) equity issues tradable over the counter, in principle, must be those regis-
tered with the Japan Securities Dealers Association.
Id. at 42; see IsAACs & Ejnu, supra note 72, at 29 (noting characteristics of each market).
173. See supra note 172 (discussing lack of standard prices in OTC market).
174. Id. at 83. Approximately 95% of the trading volume in bonds occurs over the
counter. Id.
175. TATEWAnI, supra note 15, at 82-83.
176. Id. at 82.
177. Id. The other six exchanges are in Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Nii-
gata, and Sapporo. Id. After the post-World War II boom in equities and increase in
the amount of transactions in non-listed stocks, a second section of the stock exchanges
was created in 1961,jointly listed by the stock exchanges in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.
Id.
178. Id. at 83; see supra note 3 (discussing introduction of Japanese Government
bond futures contract on TSE as advent of financial futures market in Japan).
179. FEL, Law No. 77 of 1988 (japan) (revised in 1992) (Survey Japan trans.,
1992). In addition, the FEL applies to financial futures and options contracts not de-
rived from securities, which are covered under the SEL. Id. art. 2.4; see SEL, Law No. 25
of 1948, art. 1 (Japan) (defining SEL as applying to "buying and selling of, or other
forms of transactions in, securities").
180. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948 (as amended to 1988) (Japan). Prior to amend-
ment, the SEL was compromised in response to the MOF's introduction of stock futures
trading in mid-1987. Brian Semkow, Japan's Derivative Financial Products Markets, 7 INT'L.
FIN. L. REv. 29, 29 (Dec. 1988). The Osaka 50-Stock Futures Contract ("OSF 50") had
to comply with existing law, which only permitted physical delivery of stocks, not cash
settlement. Id. To satisfy investors wishing to hedge against fluctuations in prices of
stock holdings, the MOF approved trading in the OSF 50. Id. In order to satisfy the
SEL, however, the OSF 50 was composed of 225 representative stocks of the TSE's Nik-
kei average, which allowed physical delivery of the basket of stocks upon expiration of
the futures contract. Id. For example, investors could hedge against declines in value
of their stock holdings by selling stock index futures, thus locking in a future price at
today's prices. Id. at 30. The term "hedge" identifies a position taken to offset the risk
associated with some other position. See KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 501.
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futures and options markets to a legal structure within the secon-
dary market."" Equity derivative 8 2 markets were launched with
the inception of Tokyo Stock Price Index ("TOPIX") in Septem-
ber 1988 in order to consolidate and expand futures and options
trading. 8 ' The TOPIX and 225 share Nikkei Stock Average in-
dex allow cash settlement' 8 4 instead of physical delivery of the
stocks on the index.'85 The revised SEL also created a market
for stock index futures 8 6 and options. 87 Options were intro-
duced to enable investors to hedge and limit downside risk'88
and also to achieve profits.'89
Usually, the initial position is a cash position (such as the purchase of a stock) and the
hedge position involves a risk-management instrument such as a future. Id.
181. Aoki, supra note 3, at 223.
182. See supra note 1 (defining "derivative instruments").
183. IsAAcs, supra note 123, at 2; Semkow, supra note 180, at 30.
184. See SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2.14 (Japan). Article 2 permits parties to
enter into a transaction based on the value of a securities index. Id. The parties may
settle their transaction on a future date by paying cash. Id. Cash settlement recon-
ciliates the difference between the numerical value of the index as agreed to in advance
and the numerical value of the index prevailing on the contract date. Id.
185. Semkow, supra note 180, at 30; see supra note 180 (describing how SEL, prior
to its revision in 1988, only permitted physical delivery of stocks and not cash settlement
of transactions). The Tokyo Stock Price Index ("TOPIX") and 225 share Nikkei Stock
Average index ("Nikkei 225") compete with the OSF 50. Id. Because cash settlement is
required on TOPIX and Nikkei 225, however, the OSF 50 has become more cumber-
some. Id.; see supra note 180 (explaining that OSF 50 requires physical delivery of
stocks upon expiration of contract).
186. See Thomas A. Russo, Regulation of Equity Derivatives, in SWAPS AND OTHER DE-
RIVATIVES IN 1994, at 595, 601 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-848, 1994). "Stock index futures" provide for payment obligations based on the value
of a stock index, rather than a change in that index, as of a given date. Id.
187. See SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2.13 (Japan) (defining "trading in securities
futures" as transactions in which parties prescribe payment of cash to settle difference
between contract price and price prevailing on date of settlement). Stock, or equity,
index options grant their holders payments based on changes in the value of a stock
index. Daniel P. Cunningham et al., An Introduction to OTC Derivatives, in SWAPS AND
OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1994, at 121, 128 (P11 Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B-848, 1994). The transaction involves one party that grants to another
party-in consideration for payment of a premium-the right "to receive a payment
equal to the amount by which an equity index either exceeds (in the case of a call) or is
less than (in the case of a put) a specified strike price." Id.
188. See KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 495. "Downside risk" focuses only on
possible negative results that may occur as an expected outcome, "as opposed to risk
more generally which includes any deviation, either positive or negative." Id.
189. IsAAcs, supra note 123, at 221. MOF permitted Japanese financial institutions
to trade options on specific instruments, such as U.S. government bonds and interest
rates, on overseas exchanges. Semkow, supra note 180, at 30-31.
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B. Derivative Instruments: Introductory Concepts
The use of derivatives resembles the purchase of an insur-
ance policy.1 90 Many types of derivative products, including the
swap product, 91 exist to satisfy investors' needs to hedge against
the risk of loss from their investments.192 The variable combina-
tions of derivatives are reducible to the forward-based product'9 3
and the option-based product. 94 Despite the value of derivatives
as tools for risk management, derivatives use involves basic forms
of financial risks.'95
1. Features of Derivatives and Basic Products
Derivative products provide businesses and institutional in-
vestors with a tool for insulating their investments against poten-
190. Patrick H. Arbor, Derivatives are Just Like 3 Pieces of Mom's Apple Pie, CH. TpIB.,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 13N. For example, a car owner purchases automobile insurance to
protect against possible collision damage or destruction of the car, while homeowners
buy insurance in the case of fire or storm damage. Id. Likewise, investors can buy
"insurance," in the form of derivatives, to protect against losses caused by fluctuations
in the world's interest rate, currency, commodity and equity markets. Id.
191. See John Andrew Lindholm, Financial Innovation and Derivatives Regulation-
Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 1994
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 73, 79 (1994). In a "plain vanilla" or "classic" interest rate swap,
the borrower and the investor exchange fixed- for floating-rate financing, with the float-
ing rate usually based upon the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"). Id.; see
supra note 17 (defining differences between fixed and floating rates of exchange). The
LIBOR is the basic short-term rate of interest in the Eurodollar market, similar to the
prime rate in the United States. Scorr, supra note 1, at 203; see generally KAPNER &
MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 3-35 (discussing, in detail, swap product and its origin).
192. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANcIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED
TO PROTECT THE FiNANoCAL SYSTEM 34 (GAO/GGD-94-133, May 1994) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT] (noting that derivatives use has expanded globally to a notional amount
of US$12.1 trillion because of "need for products to address the risk of volatile interest
and exchange rates and prices"). The notional value represents the amount of princi-
pal that, although never actually changing hands, is the basis upon which the interest
on a swap or related instrument is calculated. KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at
508. Because notional principle refers to the sums underlying the derivatives contracts,
not the income streams that counterparties are bound to exchange, it is an inaccurate
proxy for market value. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Infor-
mational Failure and Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE LJ. 1457, 1459 n.6
(1993) (noting that figures are usually used because numbers are readily available).
193. See Kenneth A. Froot et al., A Framework for Risk Management, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 91, 99. A forward obligates the user to buy or sell an asset for a
specifiect price on a specified future date. Id.
194. Id. An option enables the user to choose whether to buy or sell the underly-
ing asset on which the option is based at a specific price on a specific date. Id.
195. Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 40,
43-44.
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tial losses.1 96 In addition, derivatives contracts may produce es-
calating profits.' 97 Derivatives dealers, the lead actors comprised
of the large commercial banks and the major securities firms,
represent the parties on one side of the contract in search of
potential profits. 9 The other side of the contract consists of
end users, 199 who may be the dealers themselves, or institutional
investors capable of taking the risks associated with deriva-
tives.200 Investments in derivatives can also be more cost-effec-
196. Arbor, supra note 190, at 13N. For example, if an investor wants to purchase
value in the General Electric Company ("GE"), instead of buying the company's stock,
he may buy a "call" on GE, an option entitling the investor to buy GE at a specified
future time at a specified price. Loomis, supra note 195, at 43. The value of the call, or
the derivative, will be determined by what happens to the price of the GE stock, which
is the underlying asset. Id.; see supra note 1 (defining "underlying asset"). The cost of
the call, or the premium, provides great "leverage" if the stock does well. Loomis, supra
note 195, at 43. If the stock falls, the call is worthless. Id. "Leverage" involves the use of
any financial instrument or mechanism "to magnify potential returns with concomitant
magnification of financial risk." KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 505. For exam-
ple, the use of futures and options provides leverage. Id.
197. Loomis, supra note 195, at 40. Derivative contracts can produce growth rates
of 40% a year for some users. Id. "They demand superlatives, are measured in trillions
of dollars, are quintessentially global, and are positioned on what wags call 'the bleed-
ing edge of technology.' " Id. Speculators seeks to profit from valuation changes in
derivatives or their underlying assets. GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 25. "Rather than
owning the underlying [asset], speculators can use derivatives as a more affordable way
to attempt to profit from anticipating movements in market rates and prices." Id. Spec-
ulators add liquidity to the financial market, as they enter into transactions with hedg-
ers and other speculators, because their investments ensure high volumes of trading
without significant price changes. Id.; see supra note 81 (defining liquid).
198. Id. The OTC market offers greater contractual freedom than on exchanges
because the parties can individually customize their contracts, rather than conforming
them to standardized rules of an exchange. Hu, supra note 192, at 1465. The OTC
market consists mainly of sophisticated investors, like corporations and other sovereign
entities, who "negotiate directly with industrial corporations, financial institutions, or
money center banks." Id.
199. Loomis, supra note 195, at 40. "End users hedge market risks by investing in
derivatives, which counter adverse price movements." Hu, supra note 192, at 1466. In
addition, end users can "arbitrage between the price of the derivative and the market
price of the underlying asset or between prices in different capital markets." Id. The
end users are also known as "counterparties" to the contract. Loomis, supra note 195, at
41; see supra note 40 (defining arbitrage).
200. Loomis, supra note 195, at 40. Private individuals are usually unable to enter
into derivative transactions with dealers, such as banks. Hu, supra note 192, at 1465
n.29. The average contract size for derivative transactions known as interest rate swaps
at year end 1991 was US$30 million. Id.; cf. Salomon Forex v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768
(E.D. Va. 1992) (illustrating example of wealthy. individual involved in OTC currency
options). "Interest rate swaps" are individually negotiated agreements between a
dealer, such as a bank, and end user, such as a corporation, involving an exchange of
interest rate payments. Hu, supra note 192, at 1467 n.44. For example, a corporation
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tive than partaking in transactions in the underlying cash mar-
kets because derivatives offer reduced transaction costs and in-
creased leverage capabilities. °1
Derivative instruments transfer risks and increase invest-
ment opportunities otherwise inaccessible by selected purchases
of the underlying assets. 20 2 Although the definition of deriva-
tives includes such complex products as collateralized mortgage
obligations, 20 3 regulators generally focus on the basic contracts
such as swaps,2 0 4 options,2 0 5 and futures.2 0 6 Forward-based con-
tracts and option-based contracts constitute the two building
blocks for all derivative products.20 7
A forward is the most basic type of derivative, in which a
user promises to buy or sell an asset for a specified price on a
specified date.20 8  There are four primary features of forward
issues US$100 million of debt securities that mature in five years, and pay a floating
interest rate. Id.; see supra note 17 (defining floating exchange rate). The corporation
can hedge against the possibility of rising interest rates by entering into an interest rate
swap with a bank. Hu, supra note 192, at 1467 n.44. The corporation agrees to pay the
bank a fixed seven percent interest on the amount of US$100 million every year for five
years. Id. In return, the bank pays the corporation interest on the same amount, called
the "notional amount," equal to the prime rate every year for five years. Id.; see Henry
T.C. Hu, Swaps, The Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regula-
tory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 347-53 (1989) (illustrating interest rate swaps with
more extensive example).
201. GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 25. A U.S. market participant can realize
cost savings by buying or selling a derivatives contract based on the Standard & Poor's
500 Index ("S&P Index"). Id. at 26. Instead of "buying or selling all of the stocks in the
[S&P Index]," the investor can purchase or sell the derivatives contract "for as little as 5
to 10 percent of the cost of the underlying stocks." Id.; see supra note 196 (defining
leverage).
202. Lindholm, supra note 191, at 76.
203. Id. at 75. A collateralized mortgage obligation, or "CMO," is a bond backed
by a "pool of whole mortgages or by mortgage pass-throughs which are classed accord-
ing to expected maturity ranges at the time of issue." ScoTr, supra note 1, at 63. A
.pass-through security" is a "security that passes through payments from debtors to in-
vestors." Id. at 255. The security is so named because "interest and principal payments
made by borrowers are passed through monthly," after accounting for a service fee. Id.
at 255-56. Generally, the greater certainty of payment size in a CMO is offset by lower
returns based on the purchase price. Id. at 63.
204. See supra notes 191, 200 (discussing swap product).
205. See supra note 194 (defining options).
206. GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 26; see supra note 3 (defining futures).
207. Froot, supra note 193, at 99.
208. Id.; Loomis, supra note 195, at 44. For example:
[A] long forward position of 1,000 barrels of oil at a price of US$20 per barrel,
with a one-year maturity, obligates the user to buy 1,000 barrels of oil (or its
cash equivalent) one year hence for US$20,000. A short forward position obli-
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contracts. 20 9  First, the gain earned from a forward contract
when the value of the underlying asset moves in one direction
equals the loss incurred if the underlying asset moves in the op-
posite direction.210 Second, no money changes hands when the
forward contract is initiated between the parties. 21 1 Third, the
forward contract is settled at maturity.212 Last, forward contracts
are traded mainly in the OTC market, and thus may be custom-
ized for the user.21 3 The most common type of forward contract
is the swap contract.21 4
Unlike a party to a forward contract, the holder of an op-
tion may choose to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified
price on a specified date, but has no obligation. 215 The holder
gates the user to deliver 1,000 barrels of oil (or its cash equivalent) for
US$20,000. Long positions enable hedgers to protect themselves against price
increases in the underlying asset; short positions protect hedgers against price
decreases.
Froot, Supra note 193, at 99.
209. Froot, supra note 193, at 99.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see supra note 198 (discussing how investors may customize their contracts
in OTC market).
214. Loomis, supra note 195, at 43; see supra notes 191, 200 (defining swap prod-
uct). Swaps are packages of forward contracts, and share the same basic features.
Froot, supra note 193, at 99. A company that issues floating-rate debt over ten years,
requiring annual interest payments, can use a swap to convert its floating-rate obliga-
tion into a fixed-rate obligation, thereby hedging against future increases in the interest
rate. Id. This swap is merely "a bundle of interest-rate forward contracts." Id.
Futures contracts also resemble forwards, except that they are "marked to market"
on a daily basis. Id. The user pays cash to cover any losses on the transaction, and cash
is paid to the user to reflect any profits. Id. The technique of marking to market
reduces counterparty risk because each party's liability or profit is recorded and settled
each day. Id.
215. Id. For example, "a call option on oil might grant the user the right to buy
1,000 barrels of oil at a price of US$20 per barrel anytime between now and one year
hence. Conversely, with a put option, the user would have the right to sell the oil at the
agreed upon price." Id.; see BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 203-30 (describing origin of
options and variables used in pricing options under Black-Scholes Option Pricing
Model). Bernstein recounts Aristotle's story of the philosopher Thales the Milesian
who had exceptional skill in reading the stars:
One winter he foresaw that the autumn olive harvest would be much larger
than normal. He took the little money he had saved up and paid quiet visits to
all the owners of olive presses in the area, placing small deposits with each of
them to guarantee him first claim on the use of their presses when fall arrived.
He was able to negotiate low prices, for the harvest was still -nine months off,
and, anyway, who could know whether the harvest would be large or small....
When the harvest-time came, and many [presses) were wanted all at once and
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of a call option can profit a great deal if the price of the underly-
ing asset rises. 16 If the price of the underlying asset falls, how-
ever, the holder will not exercise the option; the holder only
loses the premium paid to the seller.21 7 Unlike forwards, money
is exchanged in the form of a premium paid to the seller in con-
sideration for the buyer's right to allow the option to expire
either before or on the maturity date. 18 In addition, options are
settled when the holder exercises his right to purchase or sell the
underlying asset, which may occur before the maturity date.2 19
Finally, options are available both on exchanges and in the OTC
market.220
Swaps are the most common OTC derivative and share the
same risks as other OTC derivatives. 1 Swaps are contractual
agreements between two counterparties, in which the parties
agree to make periodic payments to each other. 2  The most
common types of swaps are the interest-rate swap223 and the cur-
rency swap.224 Swaps have borne a host of variations designed to
of a sudden, he let them out at any rate he pleased, and made a quantity of
money.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 203-04. "Aristotle's anecdote about Thales and his finan-
cial device is the first recorded mention of the instrument that has come to be known as
an option." Id. at 204.
216. Froot, supra note 193, at 99; see supra note 215 (defining call option and put
option).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See SATYAJrr DAS, SWAPS AND FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 3-4 (1994) (describing
prominence of swaps within global capital markets by illustrating size of swap market
(US$4.6 trillion at end of 1992), variety of participants in swap market (including cor-
porations and government financial institutions), and variety of uses for swap transac-
tions). "[W]hat have really been burning up the track are OTC derivatives, the tailor-
made contracts whose dazzling growth began in the mid-1980s .... These are the
derivatives that are making the business so complex and difficult for regulators to get
their arms around." Loomis, supra note 195, at 43.
222. KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 4. The swap agreement specifies "the
currencies to be exchanged (which may or may not be the same); the rate of interest
applicable to each (which may be fixed or floating); the timetable by which the pay-
ments are to be made; and any other provisions suitable to each party." Id.; see supra
notes 191, 200 (discussing swap product).
223. See supra note 200 (defining interest rate swap).
224. KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 4. In the basic currency swap, "the two
counterparties agree to an immediate exchange... of one currency for another at
some exchange rate .... These currencies are later swapped back at the same ex-
change rate. In the interim, the counterparties exchange interest payments." Id. at 5.
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serve special purposes for industrial corporations, financial cor-
porations, banks, insurance corporations and sovereign govern-
ments.2 25 They are used to reduce the cost of capital, to manage
risks, and to arbitrage 2 6 the world's capital markets.22 7
2. Risks Associated with Derivatives Trading
Users and dealers of derivative instruments encounter sev-
eral types of risks in the marketplace, and then pass these risks to
other parties connected to the derivatives contracts. 228 First, de-
rivatives transactions may affect an entire financial system, creat-
ing systemic risk.2 1 Second, the susceptibility of prices to vola-
tile movements creates the possibility of market risk.230 Third, a
derivatives contract may create counterparty credit risk.23 '
225. Id. at Xix.
226. See supra note 40 (defining arbitrage).
227. KAPNER & MARSHALL, supra note 1, at xix. "Clearly, it is difficult to overstate
the importance of the swap markets to modem finance." Id.
228. Loomis, supra note 195, at 41. The risk is passed by the initial contract to a
dealer, who then may hedge against this risk of loss with a separate contract with an-
other dealer, who in turn may contract with a third dealer or a speculator who wants
the risk. Id.
229. Id. at 41; see Hu, supra note 192, at 1502 (explaining interdependencies re-
sulting from single derivative transaction that may cause systemic collapse, such as frag-
ile payment networks of corporations and money center banks, banks' use of futures to
offset derivative deals, and link between cash markets and swap markets). Carol Loomis
imagines a crisis at a major dealer "that would cause it to default on its contracts and be
the instigator of a chain reaction bringing down other institutions and sending parox-
ysms of fear through a financial market that lives on the expectation of prompt pay-
ments." Loomis, supra note 195, at 41. But seeJohn Plender, Through a Market Darkly: Is
the Fear that Derivatives are a Multi-billion Dollar Accident Waiting to Happen Justified?, FIN.
TIMES, May 27, 1994, at 17 ("Most central bankers claim that the probability that the
mispricing of risks in derivatives could lead to a systemic shock is low.. . ."); The Beauty
in the Beast, supra note 2, at 24 ("(B]ecause derivatives contracts are a way of spreading
the risk, they should improve rather than damage the aggregate position of companies
linked by them.").
230. Plender, supra note 229, at 17. Market risk defines "the prospect that prices
will take off in a direction that leaves them [dealers] losers on unhedged positions."
Loomis, supra note 195, at 52; see Hu, supra note 192, at 1468-69 (discussing market risk
for seller of option as risk that underlying asset will move in wrong direction, and not-
ing that losses are potentially unlimited). When a bank loans money to a corporation,
market risk arises because interest rates or other market factors may move in an adverse
position. Id. In contrast to the risk of unlimited losses from derivatives contracts, the
maximum loss from a bank loan is usually the "sum of the principal and the accrued
interest." Id.
231. See Plender, supra note 229, at 17. "Counterparty credit risk" involves the
threat of default by the opposing party to a derivatives contract. Id.; Hu, supra note 192,
at 1468-69 (discussing credit risk as buyer worrying whether seller of an option, or
"writer," will fail to perform). A bank assumes credit risk when it loans money, the risk
2004 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1970
Fourth, because a financial instrument cannot be replaced at
close to its fundamental value, derivatives hold out the chance of
liquidity risk.3 2 Fifth, the potential failure of internal control
systems, including computers, gives rise to operational risk.y3
Lastly, the significant losses at major institutions in recent
months may have stemmed from legal risk, 3 4 where one of the
parties was unauthorized to conduct such business, and the de-
rivatives contract thus may be unenforceable.3 5
Apart from obstacles to the users of derivatives, derivatives
activities cause financial risks associated with the disclosure prac-
being that the borrower will fail to perform its obligations. Hu, supra note 192, at 1468-
69. Because of counterparty credit risk, opposing parties to the contract could ask, for
the duration of a deal that may take years, "will the guy on the other side of the contract
be good for whatever he turns out to owe, if anything?" Loomis, supra note 195, at 44.
Although dealers investigate the credit quality of their counterparties, a five- or ten-year
derivative contract may cause a counterparty's creditworthiness to deteriorate. Id. at 52.
232. Plender, supra note 229, at 17. This is also known as valuation risk. Loomis,
supra note 195, at 53. Volatility is measured based upon the expectations, rather than
the true value, of the contracting parties. Id. Thus, valuation risk "addresses the possi-
bility that the profits of a transaction may be misstated." Id.
This idea is best understood by analyzing the theory behind investment in the stock
or bond markets, and the concomitant theory of true value. BERNSTEIN, supra note 40,
at 7. The prices of stocks and bonds move in response to information of all types. Id.
Furthermore, the prices of stocks and bonds are liquid, enabling purchases and sales to
be easily reversed. Id. Lastly, stock and bond prices "reflect people's hopes and fears
about the future, which means they can easily wander away from the realities of the
present." Id. at 8. Economists, therefore, note that "value refers to something that lies
behind, or beneath, the prices observed in the marketplace." Id. at 117. "Prices gyrate
around 'true value.' " Id. The liquidity risk stems from the basic uncertainty in the
underlying asset; in the case of a stock or bond, that asset's price is subject to the expec-
tations of random investors in the market place, rather than the true value of the asset.
Id. Indicating the uncertain nature of true value, Bernstein analogizes it to an ex-
change among three baseball umpires trying to describe how they call balls and strikes:
"'I call them as I see them,' said the first. 'I call them as they are,' replied the second.
'They ain't nothing till I call them,' declared the third." Id.
233. Plender, supra note 229, at 17.
234. GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 64-65. Legal risk in a derivatives contract
exists because of the possibility that a court or regulatory body may find the contract
unenforceable. Id. at 64. For example, losses suffered by Orange County, California
implicated legal risk. See Laura Jereski, Orange County Seeks Fast Ruling that Merrill Deals
Weren't Legal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at B7 (discussing Orange County's claim that
transactions called reverse-repurchase agreements, executed by Merrill Lynch for
county, violated California constitutional limitation on municipal debt, were beyond
scope of municipality's power, and thus would enable county to rescind deal with Mer-
rill Lynch); G. Bruce Knecht, P&G Amends Lawsuit Naming Bankers Trust, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 1995, at A3 (reporting Proctor & Gamble's new claim that Bankers Trust vio-
lated U.S. federal securities laws in sale of swaps based on German interest rate after
SEC announced that similar derivatives transactions fell within ambit of securities laws).
235. Plender, supra note 229, at 17.
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tices by corporations and financial institutions.2 36  Derivatives
are termed off-balance-sheet23 7 instruments238 because account-
ing rules23 9 do not require that their rapidly-changing values be
reported on the balance sheet.2 4 In order to improve financial
reporting and accurately state the changing values of derivatives,
banks have adopted the practice of marking to market.2 41
236. Id.
237. See ScoTr, supra note 1, at 24. A "balance sheet" is the financial statement of
a business or institution that compiles and lists the assets, liabilities, and owners' invest-
ment on a specified date. Id. "Off-balance-sheet activities" involve commitments of
banks that do not appear on their balance sheets but, nevertheless, represent contrac-
tual obligations. WOELFEL, supra note 95, at 866.
238. Loomis, supra note 195, at 41. The problems associated with an "off balance-
sheet" instrument were demonstrated with the losses suffered by a Japanese oil com-
pany. Plender, supra note 229, at 17. In the early part of 1994, Kashima Oil learned
that it had lost US$1.5 billion in foreign exchange derivative trading (the underlying
asset was an exchange rate of a foreign country). Id. The creditors of the company
might have believed they were dealing with a company that was only subject to fluctua-
tions in oil prices. Id. However, the company was also a foreign exchange dealer, not
represented on the balance sheet, which created currency risks that soon caused the
heavy losses. Id.
239. See GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 92. Accounting rules provide investors,
creditors, regulators, and other users of financial reports with consistent and reliable
information by ensuring accurate financial reporting. Id. In the United States,
"[a] ccounting rules define how the transactions of an enterprise should be recognized,
measured, and reported in the enterprise's financial statements." Id. at 93.
240. Plender, supra note 229, at 17. A bank may borrow in such a way that the
obligation is not recorded on its financial statement. WOELFEL, supra note 95, at 866.
Financial futures and options contracts are obligations that need not be recorded on a
bank's balance sheet. Id. Although such activities may increase a bank's exposure to
risk, the off-balance-sheet activities offer more leverage than would be obtained from
the bank's lending and investment activities. Id. Accounting rules established by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), called Statements of Financial Ac-
counting Standards ("SFAS"), only address forward contracts and futures contracts,
with no specific rules regarding swaps or options. See BILL D. JARNAGIN & JON A.
BOOKER, SPAS No. 52 (December 1981), Foreign Currency Translation, in FINANCIAL Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS 987, 1000-01 (1985) [hereinafter SEAS No. 52] (explaining that
forward exchange contracts entered into for speculative purposes are recorded on bal-
ance sheet at market value, with subsequent changes in market value recorded as gains
or losses on income statement); BILL D. JARNAGIN &JON A. BOOKER, SEAS No. 80 (August
1984), Accounting for Futures Contracts, in FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 1045, 1045
[hereinafter SEAS No. 80] (explaining accounting treatment for exchange traded fu-
tures contracts in United States or other countries, and specifying that unless futures
contract is used as hedge of an asset or liability carried on balance sheet at cost, any
gain or loss in market value is immediately recognizable on financial statement). Be-
cause there are no rules for options, swaps, or forwards not involving foreign exchange
rates, such contracts are reported, in practice, by analogy to SEAS No. 52 and SEAS No.
80. GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 95-96.
241. See DowNs & GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 248. The term "mark to the mar-
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II. REGULATORY APPROACHES TO DERIVATIVES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
The U.S. financial futures markets, which began trading in
1974,42 benefit from over twenty years of experience as com-
pared with ten years for the Japanese futures markets.2 4
Notwithstanding this experience, large losses registered by such
entities as MG Corp.,2 1 Showa Shell Co., 245 Gibson Greetings
Co., 2  Orange County,24 7 and Barings PLC248 between 1992 and
early 1995 have caused the U.S. Congress 249 and U.S. regulatory
ket" denotes adjustment of the value of a security to reflect current market values. Id.;
Plender, supra note 229, at 17.
242. See supra note 5 (explaining beginning of U.S. futures trading on exchanges
with establishment of CFTC). Under the Act, the CFTC assumed broad powers, includ-
ing the right to close markets and fix prices. John H. Stassen, The Commodity Exchange
Act in Perspective: A Short and Not-So-Reverent History of Futures Trading Legislation in the
United States, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 825, 833 (1982).
243. Semkow, supra note 180, at 29. The MOF created the derivative financial
products markets on October 19, 1985 by establishing a futures market for Japanese
government bonds on the TSE. Id.; see supra note 3 (noting same).
244. Reerink, supra note 2, at 58. The oil trading firm MG Corp, the U.S. subsidi-
ary of Metallgesellschaft AG, a metals and mining conglomerate in Frankfurt, Germany,
reported losses of US$1.3 billion in November 1993. Id. MG Corp. hedged its long-
term supply agreements with futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
Id. MG Corp. bet that oil prices would rise, and lost when oil markets dropped six
percent. 1d.
245. Id. at 62. Showa Shell Co. is ajapanese oil refining company, 50% of which is
owned by Royal/Dutch" Shell Co. Id. In 1992, Showa Shell Co. currency traders lost
US$1 billion from misplaced bets that the yen would fall against the dollar. Id.
246. Lipin & Taylor, supra note 2, at Cl. Gibson Greetings Co. sued Bankers
Trust, a leading derivatives dealer, for losses suffered from derivatives that Bankers
Trust advised for purchase. Id. The SEC and CFTC secured a consent decree from
Bankers Trust, in which Bankers Trust settled charges that it wilfully misled Gibson
Greetings in the OTC swaps market. Id.
247. Knecht, supra note 2, at A3. Orange County, California suffered over US$1.5
billion in losses from a devaluation in its investment portfolio, managed by Robert Cit-
ron, the fund's manager and county treasurer. Id. Using funds managed for a large
number of California municipalities and public agencies, the treasurer leveraged
US$7.5 billion by investing in derivatives. Id. The derivative investments accounted for
42.5% of the fund's investments before the losses. Id. Rising interest rates caused the
county's portfolio to fall in value because the treasurer had bet rates would fall. Id.
248. Webb, supra note 2, at Al. Barings PLC, a two-century-old British investment
bank, collapsed when Nicholas William Leeson, one of the firm's traders in Singapore,
lost over US$1 billion from huge volumes of futures and options trading in Japanese
stock-index futures contracts. Id.
249. See 141 CONG. REc. E447-01 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ed-
ward J. Markey [D-Mass.]) (proposing Derivatives Dealers Act of 1995 in response to
"disastrous consequences of derivatives losses by Barings PLC-one of Great Britain's
oldest merchant banks"); 141 CONG. REC. E35-02 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez [D-Texas]) (proposing Derivatives Safety and Soundness Su-
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agencies2 50 to question the regulatory structure of the derivatives
markets.2 15  Although Japan's tightly regulated derivatives mar-
kets differ from U.S. derivatives markets, Japan has promulgated
new regulations such as increased disclosure requirements for
financial institutions. 52 Increased regulations in the Japanese
derivatives markets have caused Japanese investment capital to
flee to overseas markets.2 53
A. Present Regulations in the United States
The establishment of the Commodity Exchange Act 25 4
("CEA") in 1936 created the legal structure for U.S. futures trad-
ing in goods other than grain.25 5 The 1974 amendments to the
CEA reserved power to the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission2 156 ("CFTC") and expanded the definition of a commod-
ity257 to include any future that could be traded in the mar-
kets.258 Because of the SEC's responsibility for securities-related
pervision Act of 1995 after Orange County went bankrupt from derivatives holdings);
see also supra notes 247-49 (discussing losses by Orange County and Barings PLC).
250. Compare supra note 246 (indicating that SEC and CFTC used securities laws
for first time in attempt to control derivatives trading in Bankers Trust case with Gibson
Greetings Co.) with Feuding Away TheirFutures, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1994, at 101 (noting
that Chicago's two largest futures exchanges, Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, sought less regulatory intrusion from CFTC in bid to attract
more investment in risk-management products).
251. See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text (explaining losses in major in-
stitutions and noting congressional response).
252. See Japan to Stiffen Derivatives Audits, Disclosure for Banks, Securities Firms, supra
note 4 (reporting that MOF will increase audit staff and demand tighter disclosure re-
quirements from financial institutions trading in OTC derivatives).
253. See Regulations on Derivatives Market Called Premature, Japan Econ. Newswire,
Oct. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File (noting that regulations cause
derivatives dealers, including securities firms and banks, to move offshore).
254. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
255. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) ("This chapter shall apply to . . . contracts of sale (or
options on such contracts) for future delivery of a group or index of securities .. ").
256. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2); see supra note 5 (explaining Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act, which first established CFTC); Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Ex-
change Monopoly-Reform Is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. Ruv. 977, 984 (1991) (explaining
same). The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") provides that all transactions in com-
modity futures contracts and commodity options, with certain exceptions, must occur
on or subject to the rules of the futures exchanges, which are subject to the supervision
of the CFTC. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii); Cunningham, supra note 187, at 164.
257. 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "Commodity" includes certain enu-
merated agricultural products and "all other goods and articles, except onions.., and
all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in
the future dealt in." Id.
258. Id.; Cunningham, supra note 187, at 164.
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products and the CFTC's supervision of futures exchanges, the
SEC and CFTC share regulatory oversight of derivative prod-
ucts.
2 5 9
1. Regulatory Responsibilities for the SEC and CFI'C in the
U.S. Derivatives Markets
The type of instrument and the entities involved in deriva-
tives transactions determine the agency that regulates the con-
tracts. 260 Exchange-traded derivatives, based on securities or op-
tions on securities are regulated by the SEC.2 61 Derivatives con-
tracts on commodities, including commodity futures,
2 62
commodity options,263 and options on commodity futures,2 64 ex-
ecuted on a commodities or futures exchange are regulated by
the CFTC.265 The CFTC possesses exclusive jurisdiction to regu-
259. Arbor, supra note 190, at 13N. The SEC supervises all trading in securities-
based products. See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing
reasons for implementation of Exchange Act, including necessity to monitor and con-
trol securities transactions conducted on securities exchanges). "Security" is defined
with reference to a list of: non-exclusive items, and a caveat stating "in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" 15 U.S.C. § 78c. The SEC was estab-
lished to oversee rules enumerated in the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d. The CFTC
oversees derivatives based on products traded over designated futures exchanges, such
as the Chicago Board of Trade. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (granting jurisdiction to CFTC over
"transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or
executed on a contract market designated pursuant to ... any other board of trade,
exchange, or market").
260. Balvinder S. Sangha, Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues, Bus.
ECON., Jan. 1995, at 46.
261. 15 U.S.C. § 78c; see supra note 259 (defining security under Exchange Act and
noting SEC supervision of securities transactions over exchanges). The Securities Act
also defines security, encompassing within the definition any right or contract to
purchase a security, otherwise known as a stock option. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Generally, the SEC has jurisdiction over all instruments that fall within
the definition of a security, and that are not exempt under Section 3(a) (2)-3(a) (8) of
the Securities Act or Section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c; 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(12).
262. See WOELFEL, supra note 95, at 503. A commodity futures contract obligates
the seller to deliver a standard quantity of specific commodity on a specific future date.
Id.; see supra note 3 (defining futures); supra note 257 (noting definition of "commod-
ity" in CEA).
263. See Cunningham, supra note 187, at 128. A commodity option involves the
right, but not the obligation, to purchase or sell a specified quantity of a commodity at a
specified price. Id. The option may be settled through physical delivery of the com-
modity, or with a cash payment. Id.
264. See supra notes 194, 262 (defining option and commodity futures, respec-
tively).
265. Sangha, supra note 260, at 46. The Chicago Board of Trade is an example of
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late trading in commodity contracts for future delivery, or fu-
tures contracts, and options thereon.2
Over the counter transactions are excluded from both the
SEC's and the CFTC's jurisdictions.2 67 The SEC/CFTC Jurisdic-
tional Accord 268 divided all exchange traded and OTC deriva-
tives between the SEC and CFTC and defined the parameters
under which each agency could regulate or exempt derivative
products from its respective supervision. 69 OnJanuary 14, 1993,
the CFTC adopted regulations exempting swap agreements, the
most common OTC contracts, 270 from the CEA pursuant to an
a futures exchange regulated by the CFTC. Arbor, supra note 190, at 13N. The CFTC
monitors the futures markets to ensure a competitive environment with transparent
prices. Id.
266. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii); Russo, supra note 186, at 606. Futures trading in the United
States is confined to CFTC-approved futures exchanges. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(v) (forbid-
ding trading of futures unless § 2a(ii) is satisfied, which limits futures trading to a board
of trade approved by CFTC). Foreign currency futures have traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange since their introduction in 1972. Sangha, supra note 260, at 46.
In 1973, the Chicago Board of Trade established the Chicago Board Options Exchange
to execute transactions involving options on selected stocks. Id.
267. Russo, supra note 186, at 610-12. OTC derivatives are not viewed as securities,
and thus derivatives dealers need not be registered as broker-dealers under the Ex-
change Act. Cunningham, supra note 187, at 162; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (defin-
ing broker and dealer as person involved in effecting transactions in or buying and
selling securities). The CFTC exempted OTC swap transactions from its control by
virtue of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 ("FTPA"). 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (5) (1988
& Supp. V 1993); Cunningham, supra note 187, at 164. Also exempted from the
CFTC's power are products that are not futures contracts or commodity options, prod-
ucts falling within the Treasury Amendment's exemption for foreign products, and for-
ward contracts. See Russo, supra note 186, at 610-12 (describing these exclusions); 7
U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (exempting from CFTC certain transactions, such as
those involving foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, and others desig-
nated by Treasury Amendment); 7 U.S.C..§ la(11) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (excluding
contracts relating to sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery).
268. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i). The SEC/CFTCJurisdictional Accord ("Accord") splitjuris-
diction between the SEC and CFTC over certain products. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i) (with-
drawing from CFTC jurisdiction over options on securities or on index of securities).
269. See Russo, supra note 186, at 607-08. The Accord "split jurisdiction over op-
tions and futures contracts on certain financial instruments" between the two agencies.
Id. Pursuant to the Accord, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over all futures con-
tracts, futures on stock indices, and options on futures and options on physical com-
modities. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii). The SEC, however, may veto stock index futures contracts
that fail to meet specific statutory criteria. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(iv) (11). "Generally ... foreign
futures contracts are permitted to be offeied and sold to U.S. persons, except for for-
eign stock index futures contracts .... [S]tock index futures transactions [are prohib-
ited] in the United States, unless the CFTC finds that a specific contract meets certain
criteria." Russo, supra note 186, at 608.
270. See supra note 221 (noting size of global swap market, variety of participants in
swap market, and host of uses for swap products).
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amendment to the CEA, enacted by Congress in 1992.271 The
Futures Trading Practices Act 272 ("FTPA") restricts the CFTC
from conflicting with the SEC/CFTC Jurisdictional Accord. 73
2. Recent Proposals for Regulations in U.S. Derivatives
Markets
Several members of the U.S. Congress reacted to huge
losses from derivatives by proposing additional regulations in the
derivatives markets.2 7 4 In response to recommendations for reg-
ulation from the General Accounting Office, 75 Senator Byron
Dorgan (D-N.D.) submitted a proposal to regulate federally-in-
sured banks engaged in derivatives trading.2 7 Senator Richard
G. Lugar (R-Ind.) authored a bill 277 to reauthorize the CFTC to
271. FFPA, 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(5)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The FTPA enables the
CFTC to exclude from regulation transactions containing characteristics of futures con-
tracts. Cunningham, supra note 187, at 164. In particular, the amendment to
§ 6(c) (5) (B) empowers the CFTC to exempt swap agreements from CEA regulation. 7
U.S.C. § 6(c) (5) (B). The CFTC's exemption of swap agreements was a response to a
negative reaction by participants in the swap market, who shifted swap transactions to
overseas markets because of regulations of swaps prior to the FTPA's exemption. Cun-
ningham, supra note 187, at 164.
272. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(5)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
273. Id. § 2(a) (i). The CFTC has exemption power, with certain exceptions. Id.
§ 6(c)(1). One exception forbids the CF'TC from conflicting with any of the purposes
of the CEA. Id. § 6(c)(2)(A). Thus, the CFTC cannot exempt from its regulatory
power products over which it does not possess jurisdiction, as indicated in the Accord.
Id. § 2a(i).
274. See supra notes 244-50 (noting losses by financial institutions such as Barings
PLC and Orange County, which sparked congressional proposals for reform in U.S.
derivatives markets).
275. See GAO REPORT, supra note 192, at 9. The report recommends that financial
institutions should set aside extra capital against their exposure to derivatives dealing,
and such institutions should report to a special regulator. Id.
276. 140 CONG. REc. S5247-02 (1994). In a separate writing, Sen. Byron Dorgan
(D-N.D.) noted that the General Accounting Office found that OTC dealing was con-
centrated among 15 major U.S. dealers, including federally insured banks. Byron Dor-
gan, Vey RisAy Business, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1994, at 36, 38; GAO REPORT, supra note
192, at 9. Senator Dorgan suggested that he introduced the bill in the U.S. Senate to
.prohibit banks and other federally insured institutions from playing roulette in the
derivatives market." Dorgan, supra, at 40. Presently, bank capital adequacy require-
ments regulate OTC derivatives transactions by banks. Cunningham, supra note 187, at
154. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency have published capital guidelines to regulate national banks, and state banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve. Id. The Federal Reserve published its
risk-based capital guidelines for state member banks and bank holding companies in
January 1989. Id.
277. See 141 CONG. REc. S653-02 (1995) (reauthorizing CFTC in response to
CFTC's exemption of OTC derivatives trading from its regulatory power under FTPA
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exercise its regulatory oversight responsibilities and assert its
control over OTC transactions through the year 2000.278 In an
attempt to apply regulations to unregulated dealers in the OTC
markets, Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) proposed the
Derivatives Dealers Act 279 in early 1995 following the Barings
PLC debacle. 2 "° Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.) pro-
posed legislation calling for greater disclosure of derivatives ac-
tivities of all types of financial institutions.28' In contrast to the
House of Representatives, members of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee refused to embrace calls for new regulations over the de-
rivatives markets. 2
Although the CFTC was originally modeled on the SEC,2 8 3
there are several differences in regulatory approaches between
the two commissions. 2 4 These differences have caused academ-
ics to suggest unification of the regulatory bodies or creation of
a supra-agency.28 5 Furthermore, the CFTC initially has explored
and need for "confidence" in these new markets); supra notes 271 and accompanying
text (describing purpose of FTPA, which grants authority to CFTC to exempt transac-
tions from regulation, especially swap agreements).
278. See 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (amending previous section 12(d) to authorize grant of
necessary funds to CFTC for years 1995 through 2000).
279. See 141 CONG. REc. E447-01 (Feb. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Edward Mar-
key [D-Mass.]) (introducing Derivatives Dealers Act of 1995 to improve supervision and
regulation of dealers of derivatives in OTC market, including customer protections
such as full disclosure, accurate financial accounting, supervised sales practices, and
antifraud provisions).
280. See supra note 248 (explaining bankruptcy of Barings resulting from deriva-
tives trading on Japanese stock index futures contracts). A dealer in Singapore single-
handedly caused over US$1 billion in losses for Barings. Id.; Nicholas Bray & Lawrence
Ingrassia, Losses at Barings Grow to US$1.24 Billion; British Authorities Begin Sale of Assets,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at A3.
281. See 141 CONG. REc. E35-02 (Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez) (intro-
ducing Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1995 and citing Orange
County's losses as indicative of trouble caused by "risky investments" of derivatives).
282. Tim Carrington, Few Support Any New Rules on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6,
1995, at A3. In addition, heads of several U.S. regulatory bodies rejected new govern-
mental regulations in response to financial disasters suffered by such institutions as
Gibson Greetings Co. See id. (noting opposition from Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, and CFTC Chairman Mary Schapiro); supra
note 246 (discussing derivatives losses suffered by Gibson Greetings Co.).
283. Stassen, supra note 242, at 833.
284. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of
1987-The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2023-24 (1993)
(explaining differences between SEC and CFTC, such as CFTC's encouragement of
speculation in futures markets in contrast to SEC's maintenance of orderly market).
285. See, e.g., id. at 2027-31 (discussing developments toward unification but argu-
ing vehemently against such prospect).
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coordination of the regulatory systems that oversee derivatives,
futures, and securities.28 6 For example, the SEC and CFTC co-
operated in obtaining a consent decree from Bankers Trust,2 18 7
charging the bank with violating antifraud sections of federal se-
curities laws.288
B. Present Regulations in Japan
Unlike the system in the United States, the Japanese regula-
tory structure combines the cash 289 and derivatives markets and
allocates their supervision to the MOF.290 Japanese regulatory
officials assert that they do not want to make the same mistakes
in their fledgling markets that other established markets, such as
the United States, have made.2 9' Japan's apprehension in the
derivatives markets has led to excessive and burdensome regula-
tions, leaving investors with no alternative but to invest in over-
seas financial markets.2 9 2 The over-regulated derivatives markets
286. Camden R. Webb, Note, Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber-The "Sophisticated
Trader" and Foreign Currency Derivatives Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 19 N.C.J. INT'L.
L. & COM. REG. 579, 605-06 n.190 (1994).
287. See supra note 246 (explaining SEC and CFTC settlement with Bankers Trust).
288. Lipin & Taylor, supra note 2, at C1. Bankers speculated that such coordina-
tion could set precedents for dealers who sell derivatives presently free from exchange
regulations and SEC and CFTC jurisdictions. Id. "For instance, the swaps sold to Gib-
son Greetings are being treated as securities like bonds .... Swaps have traditionally
been exempt from securities laws, but the agencies found 'embedded' securities within
the swaps." Id. If securities laws apply to swaps, tougher antifraud rules will apply for
the dealers, who will then be liable for untruths in sales tactics. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) (forbidding employment of manipulative and de-
ceptive devices by those involved in transaction); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3 (1994) (prohib-
iting employment of manipulative and deceptive devices by brokers or dealers).
289. Morinobu, supra note 169, at 215-16. The "cash market" involves trades for
the immediate sale or purchase of a particular item. Scorr, supra note 1, at 51. Also
called the "spot market," the term distinguishes "transactions involving immediate or
nearly immediate delivery from transactions requiring delivery at a future time." Id.
290. See supra note 129 (indicating MOF's power to approve new security instru-
ments under Article 2 of SEL). Morinobu, supra note 169, at 215-16. In the United
States, the CFTC regulates future transactions and commodity transactions, while the
SEC regulates securities transactions involving immediate delivery. See supra notes 260-
74 and accompanying text (describing same).
291. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 222; see supra notes 3-5 (discussing Japan's late
beginnings in derivatives markets as compared with United States).
292. See Sieg, supra note 8 ("Participants in Tokyo financial markets have com-
plained that excessive formal and informal regulations are dampening derivatives deals
and forcing potentially lucrative business offshore."); see Japan to Stiffen Derivatives Au-
dits, Disclosure for Banks, Securities Firms, supra note 4 (reporting that official of Bank of
Tokyo argued that restrictive rules imposed by MOF will cause users to flee and market
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in Japan are due, in part, to a deficient understanding of the
positive attributes that derivatives contribute to a financial sys-
tem.
293
1. Regulatory Responsibilities in Japanese Derivatives Markets
Regulatory integration of the cash and derivatives markets
was designed to encourage futures transactions,2 94 but Japanese
investors have generally shunned the futures and options mar-
kets. 295 One explanation for the diminished investor participa-
tion is that dealers have used the futures markets primarily for
speculation, thereby increasing the risks inherent in any given
transaction. 96 Additionally, the MOF's restrictive regulations
imposed on derivatives such as stock index futures297 has had a
will die, and that upcoming regulatory action has forced banks and securities compa-
nies to increase derivatives business in other countries).
293. Japan Shows Gaps With Other Nations on Derivatives, Japan Econ. Newswire, Oct.
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File (reporting that comments by man-
aging director of the TSE, at recent Tokyo meeting, asking for more regulations to
ensure orderly market contrasted with other speakers' remarks calling for flexible regu-
lations to facilitate development of derivatives markets); see supra note 201 and accom-
panying text (describing that derivatives offer reduced transaction costs and better
leveraging opportunities to investors).
294. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 215. This one market approach in Japan is simi-
larly applied to Japanese derivative products traded in other countries. Id. at 221. Be-
cause derivatives based upon Japanese stock price indices are traded in overseas mar-
kets, TSE, as a cash market, concludes agreements with non-Japanese stock exchanges
or futures exchanges where non-Japanese exchanges seek to trade Japanese index deriv-
atives on their market. Id.
295. IsAAcs, supra note 123, at 220. "Although futures hold enormous potential
for the Japanese securities firms to hedge their equity positions and thus decrease their
downside risk of acting as a principal in equity trades, it is questionable whether the
hedging is actually being done." Id.
296. Id. at 221.
[T]hey [dealers] have been using computer trading to spot 'arbitrage win-
dows' in the market and simply pressing the button to trade at their dealing
desks in a frenzy of trading greed, but with no stringent controls on the hedg-
ing effect that the futures trades will have on their open equity positions.
Id. Such a fear that arbitraging will destabilize the market is perhaps unfounded. See
BERNSTMN, supra note 40, at 171 ("Arbs have acquired a certain notoriety because they
seem to be operating in some price-manipulative fashion.... Actually, they keep the
markets honest. They bring perfection to imperfect markets ... [and] bid away the
discrepancies in market prices . .. ."); supra note 40 (discussing arbitragers' intentions
in marketplace). In April 1990, TSE required arbitragers to publicly disclose their stock
positions resulting from index arbitrage activities. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 219. This
disclosure policy was enacted to aid investors in determining the amount of a stock
position that remains to be liquidated in the market. Id.
297. See David Shireff, Japan: MOF Clings to the Same Old Levers, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1,
1994, at 32. The MOF has banned the writing of options on single stocks. Id.; SEL, Law
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detrimental effect on participation, driving business to overseas
exchanges.2 98
The restrictions in the Japanese financial markets generally
derive from the MOF's authority to approve all newly offered
security products on the exchanges, as mandated under the
SEL. 99 In addition, although the MOF is authorized to grant
licenses for investment in such financial derivatives as futures
and options on interest rates and currencies,"° ° it refuses to
grant such licenses to speculators.301 The SEL forbids options or
futures written on single stocks, adding further restrictions to
No. 25 of 1948, art. 201 (Japan) (as amended to 1992) (Capital Markets Research Insti-
tute ed. & Toru Mori trans., 1993) (noting same). Japan's securities law, however, does
allow options trading on other securities and on securities indexes. See SEL, Law No. 25
of 1948, art. 2.15 (Japan) (defining "securities options trading" as transactions giving
holder of option right to buy or sell securities, as defined in Article 2, or futures on
securities index).
298. Shireff, supra note 297, at 32. "Heavy margin requirements have been im-
posed on Nikkei 225 trading in Osaka, but that has simply driven the business to Simex,
the Singapore futures exchange, where the Nikkei 225 is also traded." Id.; see George
Melloan, Leeson's Law: Too Much Leverage Can Wreck a Bank, WALL ST.J., Mar. 6, 1995, at
A15 (describing how careless trader made too many wrong bets on Nikkei 225 contracts
trading on Simex exchange); Hollowing out Japan's Financial Markets, ECONOMIST, Aug.
13, 1994, at 67 (explaining that average daily business in Nikkei stock index futures on
Simex, Singapore's derivatives exchange, is growing while such trading in Osaka, Japan
is falling because it costs international investors 40% less to trade in Singapore than it
does in Japan); see also Back to the Futures: Japanese Derivatives, supra note 4, at 82 (ex-
plaining MOF's desire to impose new controls on future industry, which MOF regards
as "playground for naughty stockbrokers," by banning arbitrage trading, which accounts
for 65% of total volume, in stock-index futures whenever MOF feels it is necessary).
299. See SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, arts. 2, 107 (Japan). Article 2 lists eight types of
"securities." Id. art. 2. Any other product not listed can become a security only if pre-
scribed by the MOF. Id. art. 2.1(9). Firms intending to trade securities, as defined in
Article 2, on a securities exchange must apply to become members of the exchange. Id.
art. 107.
300. See FEL, Law No. 77 of 1988, art. 56 (Japan) (permitting persons to engage in
"finanical futures brokerage business" only if licensed by MOF); id. art. 2.8 (defining
"financial futures brokerage business" as acceptance of orders for "financial futures
transactions"); Yamashita, supra note 6, at 229 (explaining that Tokyo International
Financial Futures Exchange, established in 1989 after FEL was enacted, was first li-
censed futures and options exchange in Japan).
301. Commodity Funds in Japan, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1994, at 87. Speculators in-
clude firms investing in commodity derivatives. Id. "By contrast, American commodity-
trading advisers, as providers of such funds are known, nearly all take positions in finan-
cial as well as commodity derivatives." Id. In addition, brokerages wishing to expand
their exchange business to currency swaps dealing and exchange options transactions
were denied licensing by the MOF. Masato Kakihara, Tokyo Report-Brokers'Discontent to
Continue, Jiji Press, Feb. 22, 1993, available in Weslaw, Int-News Database, JIJI File.
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the derivative products available for trading in Japan.
30 2
The Japanese financial structure additionally separates se-
curity derivative instruments from money market instruments.
3 0 3
Thus, the Securities Bureau of the MOF regulates the security
derivatives market and the cash market in securities °.3 1 In addi-
tion, the Securities Bureau regulates all the derivative products
of securities,3 °3 including bond futures,30 6 options on bond fu-
tures, and stock index futures and options that are traded on the
stock exchanges.3 0 7 In contrast, money market instruments such
as the yen-dollar exchange rate30 8 and Euro-yen interest rate,30 9
are traded on the Tokyo International Financial Futures Ex-
change.310
The MOF favors exchange-traded derivatives over OTC de-
rivatives because the MOF can exercise more control over the
securities traded, especially with its power to approve all new
products.311  Anti-gambling provisions in the SEL 3 1  and the
302. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 201 (Japan); see supra note 297 (identifying
same provision in SEL). But see supra note 253 and accompanying text (indicating U.S.
policy to allow options and futures contracts on single stocks under Securities Act
§ 77(b) (1)).
303. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 216.
304. Id.
305. See id. at 218. The TSE and OSE divide responsibility for stock derivatives. Id.
The TSE monitors underlying securities and the OSE caters mainly to index derivatives.
Id.
306. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 216. A "bond" is a long-term promissory note.
Sco-rr, supra note 1, at 33. A "bond future" is an agreement to take (by the buyer) or
make (by the seller) delivery of that bond on a particular date in the future. See supra
note 3 (defining "futures contract").
307. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 216.
308. See supra note 17 (defining exchange rate). In terms of the dollar, the yen is
worth a specified price, as defined by the prevailing exchange rate. Id.
309. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 216. "Euroyen" are yen deposits and yen currency
that are held in countries other than Japan. VINER, supra note 11, at 330.
310. Yamashita, supra note 6, at 216. Stock exchanges may launch futures and
options contracts as long as they are derived from securities. See SEL, Law No. 25 of
1948, art. 83 (Japan) (permitting stock exchanges to trade securities, as defined in Arti-
cle 2, including "securities index futures trading and securities options trading"). Fi-
nancial futures exchanges established under the FEL can introduce futures and options
on underlying assets that are not explicitly defined in the SEL (i.e., that are not defined
as securities). See FEL, Law No. 77 of 1988, art. 1 (Japan) (restricting coverage of FEL
to "finanical futures transaction"); id. art. 2.4 (defining "financial futures transactions"
as applying to futures and options on currencies and financial indexes).
311. Japan Not Plann ing Tighter Equity Derivative Rules, Reuters, Feb. 28, 1995, avail-
able in Westlaw, Int-News Database, REUTERNEWS File. Currently, the MOF is seeking
to replace the Nikkei 225 index for exchange-traded derivatives with a new index, the
Nikkei 300. Id.; see supra note 299 (explaining MOF's authority to approve new security
2016 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1970
Commodity Exchange Law,31 3 in addition to a narrow definition
of securities in the SEL,3 1 4 prevent dealers from creating new
financial products. 315 All new financial products must first be
approved by the MOF, 16 and then traded on an exchange, in
order to satisfy Japanese regulations.3 17 Swap transactions are
not regulated by any formal laws or administrative guidances.3 18
In order to control OTC trading in swap transactions, however,
the MOF has required stricter disclosure rules by financial insti-
tutions dealing in such derivatives. 1 9
2. Effect of MOF Regulations on Japanese Derivatives Markets
The MOF's tight control over the derivatives markets has
caused Japanese investment firms to divert capital to overseas
markets.3 20 Fearful of the disasters suffered by more exper-
products before they are introduced on stock exchanges); FEL, Law No. 77 of 1988, art.
2.4(2) (Japan) (permitting transactions based on underlying values of financial in-
dexes).
312. See SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 20 (Japan). Speculation on the securities
index off the exchanges is prohibited. Id.
313. See Commodity Exchange Law of Japan, Law No. 239 of 1950, art. 145 (Ja-
pan), translated in 6 Law Bull. Series (EHS), MM1, MM97 (1986) (forbidding transac-
tions based on quotations from commodity market unless executed on commodity ex-
change).
314. See supra note 299 (explaining definition of securities in SEL); Oda, supra
note 133, at 142 (noting definition of securities in Japanese SEL focuses on legal form
of products and is limited to regulation over traditional securities whereas Exchange
Act in United States defines securities on a broader scale); supra note 259 (discussing
Exchange Act's definition of securities in United States). New financial products usu-
ally fall outside of the Japanese SEL, and thus MOF approval is required in order to
comply with the SEL. Id.
315. YASUDA ET AL., GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRAcnTCES AND
PRINCIPLES 217 (App. II: Legal Enforceability, July 1993).
316. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 2.1(9) (Japan); see supra note 299 (noting need
for MOF approval of all new security instruments).
317. SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 20 (Japan); supra note 299 (noting SEL's prohi-
bition of off-exchange trading by members of exchange).
318. YASUDA, supra note 315, at 217.
319. Japan to Stiffen Derivatives Aud4, Disclosure for Banks, Securities Firms, supra note
4. "The [MOF] will urge commercial banks to disclose sums of potential risks of over-
the-counter instruments, including currency and interest-rate swaps, options . .. and
exotic products." Id. The MOF will require banks to report to customers the reasons
why derivatives are used and bank risk management policies followed in derivatives-
related investments. Id.; see Economic Developments and International Finance, Banking Re-
port (BNA) (Feb. 13, 1995) (noting MOF will reinforce regulations on financial deriva-
tives sold by banks and securities firms).
320. See Regulations on Derivatives Market Called Premature, supra note 253 (noting
thatJapanese securities firms and banks have set up subsidiary companies in Singapore
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ienced U.S. derivatives markets, 2' the MOF has responded with
increased regulations, 2 forcing organizations such as the
Global Derivatives Study Group... to claim that Japan lacks full
understanding of the proper regulatory structure.3 24 Further-
more, strict MOF regulations have strangled the growth of the
Japanese derivatives markets by constricting dealers' participa-
tion in OTC transactions and forcing dealers and investors to
trade only on heavily regulated exchanges.32 5
III. JAPAN SHOULD HALT ITS REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES MARKETS
The U.S pressure for reform of the Japanese financial sys-
tem in the 1980's, which triggered an overhaul of Japan's SEL,
illustrated the close relationship between Japanese and U.S. fi-
and Hong Kong where derivative transactions are growing amid looser regulatory struc-
tures); Linda Sieg, Japan Derivatives Players Bemoan Restrictions, Reuters, Oct. 14, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, REUAPB File (reporting that heavy restrictions in
Japanese markets force dealers to resort to "back-door deals" in OTC derivatives in
overseas markets).
321. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining Japanese determination
to avoid perils suffered by "early starters" such as United States in derivative markets).
322. See supra notes 319 and accompanying text (analyzingJapanese regulations of
derivatives).
323. See GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STuDv GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACricES AND PINCI-
PLFS 3 (1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DERrVATIVES GROUP]. The Global Derivatives Group
offered 20 recommendations to dealers and end users of derivatives for better manage-
ment of the risks associated with derivatives. Id. The Group of Thirty sponsored the
study as an "unofficial but authoritative review of industry practices and performance."
Id. at i.
324. YASUDA, supra note 315, at 218 (noting that "it is almost impossible to state
definitively what the current regulatory position of the Uapanese] government is with
respect to... swap transactions"). The study noted that byJuly 1993, no governmental
agency had outlined clear guidance for regulation of swap transactions. Id.; see Shireff,
supra note 297, at 32 (claiming that such actions as ban on sale of options on single
stocks and arbitrary definition of financial instruments such as swaps result in "guiding
market practice without writing clear rules" that cause obstacles to "efficiency and
proper price formation").
325. Japan a 'Developing Country'in Derivatives: Think Tank, supra note 6 ("For fur-
ther development, it is necessary for deregulation and efficiency of the transaction sys-
tem to proceed."). The study also indicates that the Japanese total of investment in
derivatives represents only 10.6% of the global total, estimated at US$35.1 trillion. Id.
In addition, the study illustrates thatJapanese derivative trading is concentrated in de-
rivative products traded over securities exchanges, such as stock index futures or inter-
est rate futures. Id. This compares unfavorably with U.S. and European derivative trad-
ing, which is predominantly over the counter, such as interest rate or currency swaps
executed between investors. Id.
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nance 3 2 6 The two countries' elite statures within the global
economy 2 7 present an ideal situation for information-sharing
and influence-peddling for change in each other's financial mar-
kets. Despite this parallel situation between the United States
and Japan, the United States has focused on conforming to the
new global economy while Japan's MOF has resisted.32 8 As
global capital and resources increasingly flow toward emerging
markets,32 9 investors search for loosely regulated derivatives mar-
kets.13 0  Favoring tighter regulations in the financial sector3 3 1
and displaying an historical tendency to follow the United States
in the financial markets, 3 3 2 Japan will likely pursue the U.S.
course toward increased regulations of derivatives markets. Ja-
326. See supra notes 109, 124-30 and accompanying text (indicating U.S. pressure
for reform of Japanese financial markets in early 1980's, which resulted in structural
reform of Article 65 of SEL and introduction of Financial Systems Reform Law of 1992,
permitting banks and securities firms to cross barrier previously separating them, and
reserving right of MOF to approve all new securitized products not specifically deemed
securities by SEL); supra note 292 (noting definition of "securities" in SEL).
327. See BiLL ORR, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE 90s: A USER'S GUIDE 27 (1992).
"The three economic superpowers," the United States, the European Community, and
Japan "produced 57% of the gross world product with 13% of the world's population."
Id. The "average per-capita GNP in these economies" exceeded the world average by
four times in 1989. Id. Per capita GNP measures average output available for each
person in a country's economy. Id. In 1989,Japan's economy outgrew all others, with a
rate of 4.8%, compared to U.S. growth of three percent Id. at 28.
328. Michael Hirsh, Why Japan Won't Change, INSTIIUtIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1994,
at 37-38. The powerful bureaucracy has been slow to institute deregulation in the mar-
kets. Id. at 37. The MOF has failed to respond to the "hollowing out" of the Japanese
economy, or the movement ofJapanese industry and services overseas. Id. at 38.
329. See id. at 38 ("Japan's financial markets have slowed as if hit by a sudden
power drain. The electricity has flowed to the rest of Asia as resources and talent pour
into a slew of emerging capital markets."); Hollowing Out Japan's Financial Markets, supra
note 298, at 67 (reporting fear by "Tokyo's moneymen" that "financial business is flee-
ing to Singapore, Hong Kong and London").
330. Tokyo's Financial Hypochondria, ECONoMisr, Aug. 13, 1994, at 16 (indicating
concern by Japanese businessmen that Japan as an "international financial centre"
could by overtaken by its rivals in Hong Kong and Singapore because of "stiff regula-
tion" that has "strangled trading in options and other derivatives in Japan").
331. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing MOF's extensive
control over securities regulation and its refusal to minimize regulations in order to
promote free financial markets); supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (explain-
ing MOF's use of informal, rather than formal, administration of securities laws and
banking and insurance industries, in comparison to SEC's formal enforcement strategy
in United States, but noting that public defers to MOF in all circumstances).
332. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing Occupation's suc-
cesses in dissolving zaibatsu and democratizingJapan by shifting more power over econ-
omy to individual investors); supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (explaining
adoption ofJSEC and SEL of 1948 in order to better replicate U.S. financial regulatory
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pan, instead, should rebuke this tendency to follow the United
States and welcome the benefits of a deregulated economy.53 3
A. Why Japan Will Follow Present U.S. Solutions to Recent Problems
Associated with Derivatives Trading
The relationship between the United States and Japan indi-
cates a history of strong U.S. involvement in the Japanese finan-
cial system. For example, when Japan was hurrying to catch up
with the economies of the West during the post-World War II
period, 3 4 Japan looked to the United States for guidance to es-
tablish a regulatory structure. 3 5 The Occupation, of which the
United States was a prominent member,3 6 restructured Japan
during the post-World War II period under three democratiza-
tion principles.3 3 7 During the democratization process, the Oc-
cupation decentralized the financial system by dissolving the
powerful zaibatsu and transferring the capital in the economy to
individual investors.338 The Occupation imposed the fundamen-
tal regulatory structure that still exists in Japan today, including
the laws that govern Japan's financial system.33 9
Japanese securities regulation developed into a legal struc-
structure in Japan); supra note 91 (stating similarity between Article 65 of SEL ofJapan
to U.S. Glass-Steagall Act in its separation of banking and securities industries).
333. See supra note 7 (explaining that deregulation improves financial strength of
nations because it reduces transaction costs, attracts new capital to financial markets,
and increases flexibility of market participants).
334. See YAMASHiTA, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining rapid rise ofJapanese economy
in three decades following end of World War II due, in part, to Western technology and
low cost of energy).
335. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text (explaining three major changes
to Japanese financial markets instituted by Occupation, including democratization by
shifting power from zaibatsu to individuals, reorganization of banks within financial sys-
tem, and creation of Securities and Exchange Law to manage and direct securities mar-
kets).
336. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. dominance of
Occupation effort in Japan after World War II and resulting reform ofJapanese finan-
cial system, which led to period of economic transformation until 1970's).
337. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (listing Occupation's principles,
including ban on futures trading and establishment of SEL of 1948 to satisfy Occupa-
tion's requirements as new guide for statutory regulation of Japanese securities mar-
kets).
338. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (explaining dissolution of
zaibatsu and increased power of individual investors within Japanese economy during
post-World War II Occupation period).
339. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (asserting Occupation's role in re-
shaping Japanese financial system following World War II).
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ture resembling that existing in the United States. The central
aspect of the Japanese financial system, the SEL, was modelled
on the U.S. securities acts. 4 ' In addition, Japan followed the
U.S. Glass-Steagall Act341 in erecting a wall between the securities
and banking sectors of the economy.3 42 The recent relaxation of
Japan's Article 65 of the SEL as it applies to banks and securities
firms resembles the current movement in the United States to
dismantle the Glass-Steagall Act.3 4 3 Finally, the MOF was given
the same regulatory powers as the SEC in the United States.3 "
Given the U.S. experience with derivatives markets, having
permitted exchange-traded derivatives since 1974,s4  Japan is
again likely to seek guidance in its nascent derivatives markets.3 46
Japan lacks a comprehensive understanding of derivatives, hav-
ing recently introduced derivatives to the financial system.347 In
contrast, the United States began trading derivatives over its ex-
changes more than a decade prior to derivatives trading in Ja-
pan. 48 Consequently, Japan can benefit by studying U.S. mis-
340. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing parallel to U.S. Se-
curities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934 and giving overview of securities regula-
tions embodied in SEL of 1948).
341. See supra notes 91,119 (discussing division between securities and banking in
United States imposed by Glass-Steagall Act of 1933).
342. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (explaining Articles 65 and 43
ofJapanese SEL and Article 10 of Banking Law, which imposed same barriers between
securities and banking as that created under Glass-Steagall Act in United States).
343. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (comparing recent liberalization of
Japan's Article 65, separating banking from securities operations, with U.S. movement
to repeal Glass-Steagall Act, providing same barrier in U.S. markets).
344. See supra note 87 (noting MOF as counterpart of SEC in United States).
345. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (signalling advent of exchange-trad-
ing in U.S. derivative markets with establishment of CFTC under 1974 amendments to
CEA).
346. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. experience of
20 years in derivative markets in contrast to Japanese experience, which amounts to less
than decade); supra note 6 and accompanying text (reportingJapan's determination to
avoid mishaps suffered from derivatives by learning from mistakes made in more estab-
lished derivatives markets, such as United States).
347. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (comparing start of futures trading
in Japan in October 1985 with exchange trading in United States in 1974); supra notes
179-87 and accompanying text (noting same but also indicating that futures and op-
tions markets were not subject to legal structure until 1988 in Japan, when SEL was
revised and FEL was adopted, followed by introduction of TOPIX and Nikkei 225 to
signal advent of equity derivative markets); KHOURY, supra note 8, at 116 ("The futures
markets in Japan are still in their infancy in terms of diversity of products when com-
pared with those in the United States.").
348. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (signalling opening of futures trading
in United States with amendment to CEA creating CFrC to supervise all exchange-
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takes.
The huge losses that have sparked congressional action in
the United States, however, have contributed to Japan's fear of
the effects of derivatives.34 9 The MOF's fear of losses of such
magnitude as Barings PLC has made the MOF hesitant to
proceed without more regulations. 350  Several members of the
U.S. Congress have introduced tighter regulations over OTC
markets351 and increased disclosure requirements for financial
institutions conducting derivatives transactions over the ex-
changes.3 52 The tendency is for the MOF to follow suit rather
than risk financial losses and be accountable to a populace that
can easily blame it for inaction.353
Japan should balance its desire to maintain a healthy econ-
omy against the need to curb the increasing flight of capital to
non-Japanese financial markets because of existing regulations
traded futures activity); supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text (noting same and
explaining that SEC and CFTC share regulatory responsibilities in U.S. derivatives mar-
kets, depending upon type of derivative product involved in transaction).
349. See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text (discussing losses by major in-
stitutions such as MG Corp., Orange county, and Barings PLC that sparked proposals by
some members of U.S. Congress to increase regulations of U.S. derivatives markets);
supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text (specifying proposals by Sen. Dorgan, Rep.
Lugar, Rep. Markey, and Rep. Gonzalez in United States that include greater regula-
tions surrounding institutions that deal in derivative products); see also Linda Sieg, Ja-
pan Derivatives Allerg Seen Boosted by Banngs, Reuters, Feb. 27, 1995, available in, Westaw,
Int-News Database, REUTERNEWS File. The article reports that Japanese regulators
will likely increase regulatory measures in response to Barings PLC derivatives-related
financial collapse. Id.; see supra note 248 (discussing collapse of Barings PLC in early
1995). Although the Barings case involved losses from exchange-traded derivatives as
opposed to the more complex OTC instruments, Japanese regulators have harbored
the same concerns with respect to futures, options and other exchange-traded instru-
ments as they do with OTC derivatives. Sieg, supra.
350. See Sieg, supra note 349 (noting Japanese authorities' negative reaction to
derivatives as result of Barings PLC's collapse).
351. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text (explaining proposals by Sena-
tor Dorgan and Rep. Markey to apply stricter regulations to dealers and federally in-
sured banks in OTC derivatives markets and indicating bill passed to reauthorize CFTC
control over OTC transactions through year 2000, originally proposed by Senator
Lugar).
352. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (referring to Rep. Gonzalez's pro-
posal for tighter disclosure standards with respect to derivatives transactions executed
by all financial institutions).
353. See, e.g., Hirsh, supra note 328, at 37 (explaining victory by Goldman Sachs,
U.S. investment bank, in gaining approval by MOF to "launchJapan's first public issue
of an asset-backed security" in 1994 after "haggling with the MOF for more than a year,"
which was concerned that "some unwitting Japanese investor might get burned and
blame the ministry").
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of Japanese derivatives markets.3 54 Japan should determine
whether following the United States will be more beneficial than
pursuing deregulation of the derivatives markets.355 Aside from
an historical tendency to clone U.S. regulations in the financial
markets, Japan's tightly regulated economy suggests partiality for
restrictive policies such as those presently introduced in the U.S.
Congress.
B. Why Japan Should Not Follow the United States
Japan should not implement more regulations in its deriva-
tives markets, as are proposed in the U.S. markets, because Japan
would substantially benefit from a more deregulated economy.
Recent U.S. congressional proposals embrace more centralized
regulations rather than focusing responsibility on institutions
that incur derivatives-related losses.356  Regulations would in-
354. See supra notes 320-23 and accompanying text (noting how MOF's response of
increased regulations to mounting derivatives-related losses in world financial markets
has sparked Japanese financial institutions to conduct derivatives trading in loosely reg-
ulated markets like Hong Kong and Singapore). Proponents of regulation for financial
markets seek "to maintain stability in financial markets and to guarantee that vicissi-
tudes in 'economic activity do not undermine the economic health of nations and of the
world economy." Franklin R. Edwards, Financial Institutions and Regulation in the 21st
Centuy: After the Crash?, in COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 1, 1-2
(Albert Verheirstraeten ed., 1981).
355. See KHouRv, supra note 8, at 18. In general, financial market deregulation
triggered development of innovative products during the 1970's, such as options and
futures contracts. Id. "The explosion since then in these types of contracts, the instru-
ments they cover, the uses they are put to... and other factors has been phenomenal."
IM.; see supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text (explaining option-based and for-
ward-based contracts as basic building blocks of all derivative instruments and noting
their uses for individuals and dealers). Heavily regulated financial systems are no more
stable than less regulated economies. KHOURY, supra note 8, at 37.
356. See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text. The proposal by Senator Dor-
gan would create central regulations prohibiting federally insured banks from trading
in derivatives. Id.; 140 CONG. REc. S5247-02 (1994). The Derivatives Safety and Sound-
ness Supervision Act of 1995, authored by Rep. Gonzalez, would impose wholesale re-
strictions 'on derivatives trading by all types of financial institutions. 141 CONG. REc.
E35-02 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez). The bill would constrain
derivatives dealers by imposing stricter disclosure standards in light of the losses suf-
fered by Orange County, California. Id.; supra note 247 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining derivatives-related losses of California county). In contrast, an alternative view
illustrates that derivatives threaten the financial condition of the entities using them.
Douglas Kurz, Watch Your Derivatives, Bus. NEws, Jan. 2, 1995, at 21. The appropriate
response should involve improvement of risk management practices at such entities, an
issue of internal control, rather than "some kind of generic regulation." Id. As other
internal control systems, "controlling derivatives must take into consideration the com-
pany's culture, business objectives, financial condition and risk management practices."
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crease the transaction costs of investing in derivatives.3 57 This
negates one of the advantages for using derivatives, which is to
decrease costs of investment by either hedging other risky invest-
ments, or leveraging 3
5 8
Increased regulations will impede capital investment in Ja-
pan, as restrictions in the Japanese derivatives markets currently
push participants to overseas markets. 3 5 9  In the alternative,
should Japan not impose more restrictions, it would alert the se-
curities firms in which the MOF intends to promote investment
in Japan, and thus may induce the securities firms to stem their
investments in emerging markets and return to Japan.360  Fur-
thermore, by not following the proposals in the United States for
more regulation, Japan will gain an advantage over the United
States. If more U.S. regulations increase costs, more capital will
flee the U.S. derivatives markets in search of cheaper regulations
Id. Creating more centralized regulations socializes the risks. Jordan, supra note 345,
at 1. Individuals "shed risk" by passing it to others, keeping unchanged the total risk for
the system as whole because someone else bears risk. Id. The interplay of market
forces more efficiently allocates the profits and losses from derivatives rather than cen-
trally imposed regulations. Id. For example, exchanges hurt by the Barings PLC deriva-
tives-related losses will probably increase their fees for trading on such exchanges. Mar-
tin Mayer, How The Market Regulates Derivatives Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at A14.
This is a "true free-market solution" because the exchanges and traders who were in-
volved suffered the consequences by spending more to design "fail-safe systems to en-
sure that such a disaster won't happen again." Id.; see supra note 248 (explaining Bar-
ings disaster).
357. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (analyzing economics of deregulation
as including reduction of transaction costs compared to economy with increased regula-
tions in financial markets).
358. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (describing advantage of deriv-
atives as insulating other investments against losses and leveraging positions so as to
create possibility of tremendous profits, sometimes reaching 40%). The private bene-
fits of derivatives include lower transaction costs, which create an alternative to invest-
ing in the underlying asset, arbitrage opportunities between the price of the derivative
and the underlying asset, and ability to control market risks such as interest rate and
currency fluctuations. Hu, supra note 192, at 1465. Private benefits differ from social
benefits, which focus on how derivatives "complete markets" by reducing transaction
costs and agency costs. Id. at 1465 n.31.
359. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's minimal
understanding of derivatives, which has resulted in more regulations, causing investors
to flee to overseas markets); supra notes 299-303, 311-20 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzingJapan's regulations over derivatives markets through SEL and MOF's tight super-
vision).
360. See Hirsh, supra note 328, at 38 (noting that talent and new products are
exiting Japanese financial markets in favor of overseas markets, such as Singapore,
Hong Kong, United States, and Great Britain and thatJapanese markets are "becoming
just a local affair within the international marketplace").
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overseas.361 Japan can claim this capital by retaining its structure
and not conforming to the projected U.S. model by increasing
regulations. Capital flight from the U.S. markets may thus trans-
late into capital investment in the Japanese markets.
In determining how to regulate the derivatives markets, Ja-
pan should favor the free-market solution of less centralized reg-
ulations.3 62 Japan's deregulation of its markets in the 1970's en-
abled the creation of the derivatives markets.3 63 Japan should
361. See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, FinancialInnovation and Uncertain
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1431, 1439
(1991) (claiming that U.S. competitiveness in global capital markets has been
threatened under its current regulatory structure because trading firms seek to avoid
CEA's burdens and litigation expenses by futures exchanges by taking their innovative
products to overseas markets); supra notes 254-74 and accompanying text (describing
U.S. futures trading under CEA); supra notes 257-61, 264-67 and accompanying text
(listing regulations imposed by CFTC, through mandate of CEA, on futures trading).
362. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing free market solution by
example of response to Barings losses by exchanges and firms that were involved); Su-
zanne McGee, 'Plain Vanilla'Derivatives Can Also Be Poison, WALL ST.J., Mar. 20, 1995, at
C1, C14 (suggesting that collapse of Barings PLC, which involved poorly managed bets
on futures and options "listed on closely supervised exchanges," supports need for re-
view of internal risk management controls rather than broad-based regulations within
industry); G. Bruce Knecht, Troubled Bankers Trust Faces Some Gut-Wrenching Decisions,
WALL ST.J., Mar. 17, 1995, at C1 (noting that free market forces prevailed by punishing
Bankers Trust because its stock fell 13% and it will be compelled to adopt less sophisti-
cated derivatives strategy in order to convince investors that its operations are economi-
cally sound).
363. See KHouRv, supra note 8, at 107-08. Forced to deregulate its financial system
after the oil crisis of 1973-1974, Japan pursued a leadership role in international com-
petition that would have been impossible had Japan "remained a protected market."
Id. "One-sided internationalism was neither possible nor a stable long-run condition."
Id. at 108. The oil crisis of 1973-1974 motivatedJapan to deregulate its financial mar-
kets because its GNP declined from 10% per year to 3.6%. Id. at 106; see supra notes 98-
101 and accompanying text (noting large Japanese government and public sector defi-
cits following 1973 disruption of market forces for oil prices, which initially caused eco-
nomic downturn in Japanese economy). Because the banks began to lend increased
capital to the government to fund the deficit, corporations relied less on banks, instead
turning to financial markets for capital requirements. KHOURy, supra note 8, at 106; see
supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (explaining minimal deficits in corporate
sector after oil crisis and lower bank lending to corporate sector because of falling de-
mand for new plants and equipment). The deregulation ofJapanese financial markets
after the oil crisis "gave Japanese institutions greater freedom" to invest in the markets.
KHouRY, supra note 8, at 109. Derivative products were an outgrowth of this deregu-
latory movement as Japanese financial institutions demanded hedging capabilities. Id.
at 110; see supra note 180 (defining hedge as financial position taken to offset risk of
loss inherent in another position); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text
(describing how derivative products enable users to insulate themselves against fluctua-
tions in valuations of underlying assets); supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting
beginning ofJapanese financial futures market in 1985 and defining futures).
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not choke off the growth of derivatives. As useful investment
tools, derivatives attract capital to an economy, an important
consideration in the present competition for global capital." 4
CONCLUSION
Japan should rebuke its tendency to follow the U.S. re-
sponse toward tighter regulations, instead adopting a free-mar-
ket strategy by reducing restrictions in Japanese financial deriva-
tives markets. The MOF, slow to respond to the increasing com-
petition for global capital and the resultant outflow of capital
from Japanese financial markets, should adopt a new strategy for
derivatives. As useful investment tools, derivatives have grown
popular among global investors, exceeding twelve trillion dollars
in world-wide notional value. In recognition of this phenome-
non, the MOF should alert Japanese and non-Japanese investors
that it intends to promote increased investment in derivatives
and thus compete with more loosely regulated economies, other-
wise known as emerging markets. By loosening its stranglehold
over the economy, the MOF will improve economic efficiency by
supporting widespread derivatives use in Japan. Adopting a der-
egulatory approach to derivatives achieves the dual objectives of
supporting valuable investment tools and becoming a powerful
competitor in the modern era of global capitalization.
364. See supra note 7 (proving globalization of capital markets with statistical sup-
port). Estimates of the total value of outstanding derivative contracts reached several
trillion dollars in 1994. The Beauty in the BeasA supra note 2, at 21. Despite concern that
derivatives may make a financial system more vulnerable to losses, huge global markets
would not have emerged unless derivatives made good financial sense for all types of
users. Id. at 22.
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